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A Future for Paris? Federalism, the Law of 
Nations, and U.S. Courts 
JAMISON E. COLBURN†  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 1992 (UNFCCC),1 states-parties have negotiated commit-
ments to address global warming at annual conferences of the parties.  
The Paris Conference of the Parties (COP21) agreement in 2015 was 
carefully structured to help the U.S. President commit the nation to 
its multilateral pledges without having to seek U.S. Senate or Con-
gressional assent to doing so.2  The Obama Administration then made 
that commitment, not just to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emis-
sions, but also to cooperate fully in the research and coordinative 
tasks set out in the agreement, at the very end of its 2012-16 term.3 
President Trump’s announcement in June 2017 that he would with-
draw the United States from COP21 to seek a better deal from major 
trading partners (China and the European Union especially),4 sig-
 
© 2019 Jamison E. Colburn 
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 1.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
June 4, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 2.  Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris 
from 30 November to 13 December 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, at 21. 
 3.  Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Land-
scape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1681–82 (2017) (describing Presi-
dent Obama’s characterization of the Paris Agreement at its announcement as “historic” and 
an “ambitious” “enduring framework the world needs to solve the climate crisis,” and the 
rapid progressions from Paris’s entry into force to President Trump’s announced intentions 
to withdraw). 
 4.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV.  1201 (2018). 
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naled no intention to withdraw contrary to Article 28 or to withdraw  
from the UNFCCC under its terms.  Article 28 makes the earliest 
possible withdrawal date from COP21 November 4, 2020—the day 
after the next U.S. presidential election.5  
The coalition of state governors, mayors, county executives, and 
other leaders that quickly formed and announced their intentions to 
keep the U.S. pledges in Paris notwithstanding Trump’s announced 
plans raised profound questions about our federalism and foreign re-
lations.6  Dubbed “We Are Still In,” this coalition may present U.S. 
domestic courts with an unprecedented situation in foreign affairs 
federalism.  With most of what the preceding administration imple-
mented domestically to address climate disruption being dismantled 
by the current Administration, and much of COP21 having been de-
signed to serve a highly strategized mitigation agenda that would un-
fold decades into the future,7 these courts may have to confront sev-
eral exceedingly complex balances of state autonomy, presidential 
authority, and the place of international law within U.S. law.  And 
they will do so with an issue set that has been exceedingly polarizing 
even by today’s standards.  
The argument here is simple: simplistic invocations of “one 
voice” doctrines8 or other forms of broadly preemptive deference to a 
(current) president’s announced policy intentions cannot substitute 
for what courts and courts alone must do in any exercise of judicial 
power: say what the law is.  The context is anything but simple.  
Long traditions in both ethics and economics have aimed to knit bot-
tom-up and top-down decision-making together.9  What the Trump 
Administration’s announced intentions to withdraw from Paris seem 
to have accomplished is to shift the burden of action on the American 
 
 5.  See G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, art. 28, Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agree-
ment]. 
 6.  Cf. Jean Galbraith, Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean 
for Climate Change Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 274 (2018) (“President 
Trump has done the impossible: he has made the international community enthusiastic about 
U.S. federalism. Even as they express dismay at Trump’s plan to abandon the Paris Agree-
ment, foreign leaders and internationalists have praised the efforts of U.S. states and cities to 
combat climate change mitigation in accordance with the Agreement’s goals.”). 
 7.  See infra notes 13–127 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 190, 249 and accompanying text. 
 9.  JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE (8th ed. 
1882) (defending empiricist utilitarian methods making use of both inductive and deductive 
inferences about people, markets and society); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20–21, 
48–51 (1971) (defending a method of normative ethics that seeks a “reflective equilibrium” 
between top-down theorizing and bottom-up considered judgments). 
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pledges in Paris to states, local governments, and leading market and 
nonprofit actors—in other words, to bottom-up decision-makers.10  If 
the United States is to play any constructive part in addressing this 
unprecedented threat to global peace, security, and life on Earth, the 
burden of action will be shouldered for the foreseeable future by sub-
national governments and private parties.  
Part II introduces the Paris agreement in its unique diplomatic, 
legal, and environmental context.  Part II then describes some endur-
ing tensions of our foreign affairs federalism and the Supreme 
Court’s most recent forays into them.  Part III then anticipates three 
contexts in which American courts are most likely to confront the 
unprecedented as subnational governments strive to fulfill national 
commitments registered under the COP framework despite a current 
president’s avowed intentions to raze that very framework.  The con-
clusion considers the prospect of the 2020 election and how little that 
will probably matter to the major questions raised here. 
II. THE UNFCCC, MITIGATION STRATEGY IN TIME, AND THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 
Conventional wisdom categorizes treaties to protect the global 
commons as trading off depth for breadth.11  The more stringent the 
commitments (depth), that is, the fewer participants (breadth) that 
should be expected.12  This wisdom flows directly from the view that 
use of a global commons is the externalization of “costs” of some 
kind and, thus, treaties reversing that dynamic simply internalize 
those costs back onto the users of the commons.  But this consensus 
can obscure the unique dimensions of global climate disruption, es-
pecially the technological innovation needed to avert its worst mani-
festations.  The innovations embodied in the Paris Agreement reflect 
 
 10.  Chris Mooney, Trump Withdrew from the Paris Climate Deal A Year Ago. Here’s 
What Has Changed, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ene 
rgy-environment/wp/2018/06/01/trump-withdrew-from-the-paris-climate-plan-a-year-ago-he 
res-what-has-changed/ (noting that Trump’s announcement spurred considerable subnational 
action but left a “fog when it comes to what U.S. national policy is or should be—something 
not even the administration seems to know”). 
 11.  See, e.g., DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154–87 (HARVARD UNIV. PRESS, 2010); SCOTT BARRETT, 
ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 49–
84 (2003). 
 12.  Thomas C. Schelling, The Cost of Combating Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Nov.-Dec. 1997), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/cost-combating-globa 
l-warming; WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING (1992); see also 
BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 165. 
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those dimensions, yielding a deal that defied conventional wisdom 
and may well survive Trump’s vacuum.  Before Paris is made to fail 
in execution, we must recognize the agreement’s unique approach to 
this globally-scaled, complex collective action problem.  For if we 
eventually mark 2015 as a turning point in collective action against 
climate disruption, it will be because this approach succeeded where 
orthodox diplomacy and conventional wisdom both failed.  
This article argues that implementing Paris in the United States 
(U.S.), the European Union (EU) and other open economies will en-
tail bold innovations, mirroring those fashioned in the agreement it-
self, which will be susceptible to several lines of attack in domestic 
courts.  Only if courts adopt a discriminating approach to those chal-
lenges will they be able properly to apply the law without unneces-
sary costs to the climate and future generations.  There are three im-
portant dimensions to distinguishing Paris from what preceded it.  
First, Paris was the culmination of two decades of experience with 
the UNFCCC and its novel approach to international obligations.  
Second, mitigating climate disruption is a special type of good, unlike 
many more familiar goods in environmental protection.  Finally, Par-
is’s strategic significance must be understood in light of the counting 
difficulties with actions and quantities of such scale and scope, as 
well as the economic leakage that threatens any ambitious mitigation 
plans. 
A. The Convention/Protocol Model in Retreat: The Rise of 
Pledge and Review 
The Paris Agreement was the result of twenty-one “conferences 
of the parties” to the UNFCCC.  The UNFCCC was done twenty-
seven years ago to much fanfare at the “Earth Summit” in Río de 
Janeiro.13  The convention created the COPs as a step-wise path to 
the collective settling of mitigation obligations.  But the actual steps 
along that path dissipated what little good faith had accrued in Río, 
eventually leading the parties to fashion a unique, unilateralist 
‘pledge-and-review’ model in its place in 2015.  This section traces 
that progression and describes the Paris Agreement’s key features 
setting it apart both from the UNFCCC COPs and from the norms of 
international environmental law. 
 
 13.  BARRETT, supra note 11. Several multilateral conventions—both broad and deep—
emerged from Río, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Río Declara-
tion. See Catherine Redgwell, International Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
687, 691 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
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        The UNFCCC’s stated purpose, preventing “dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system,”14 was phrased in care-
ful but nebulous terms.  Most importantly, whatever legal obligations 
flow from the UNFCCC are collective obligations and that severely 
complicates their fulfillment by the traditional means of international 
law.  The UNFCCC dubbed these the “common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities and respective capabilities”—Río’s reference to obliga-
tions negotiators could name but could not specify.15  As a principal 
party to those negotiations, the United States quickly signed and then 
ratified the “framework” convention.16  Like many signatories, 
though, the United States rightly saw in the UNFCCC an “agreement 
to agree” on emissions abatement obligations.17  Quite apart from 
abatement per se, though, parties to the UNFCCC obliged themselves 
to collect data and report on their domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions,18 to analyze and report any abatement efforts they were 
making,19 and to base future negotiations on the “best available scien- 
 
 
 14.  UNFCCC, supra note 1, at art. 2. 
 15.  Article 3 states that “[t]he parties should protect the climate system for the benefit 
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”  UNFCCC, 
supra note 1, at art. 3(1). Typically, treaties that adopt obligations of such uncertain strin-
gency do so out of a lack of agreement among the negotiating parties.  See BARRETT, supra 
note 13, at 141–47; BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 187; David A. Wirth, The International 
and Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Sen-
ate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 521–32 (2015). 
 16.  See Wirth, supra note 15, at 521.  A “framework” convention is negotiated with the 
express intention of filling out substantive obligations through subsequent agreements or 
‘protocols.’  Id. at 519.  The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was the first attempted protocol to the 
UNFCCC, aiming to reduce global emissions 5% below 1990 levels. See Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1997, 
2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The Senate Committee that recommended 
ratification of the UNFCCC made its views known at the time that it expected any future 
protocols establishing binding emissions cuts to be presented to the Senate for its advice and 
consent. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-55, at 14 (1992). 
 17.  Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: 
A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 458–60 (1993). Although this model had grown 
common, it failed quite precipitously with the Kyoto Protocol. Cf. BARRETT, supra note 13, 
at 360 (calling the convention/protocol approach the wrong model and “unlikely to sustain 
meaningful cooperation” on GHG abatement). 
 18.  The UNFCCC’s information collection obligations may yet become be its most crit-
ical contribution to GHG abatements. See Jane Ellis & Sara Moarif, Identifying and Address-
ing Gaps in the UNFCCC Reporting Framework 27 (OECD, Paper No. 2015(7), 2015), 
https://www.transparency-partnership.net/sites/default/files/u2402/identifying-and-
addressing-gaps.pdf (noting that many of the information streams needed to assess progress 
under the Paris Agreement were already expected of so-called “Annex I” states under the 
UNFCCC). 
 19.  UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(a)-(c).  
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tific knowledge.”20  As section C shows, this may be the most conse-
quential legacy of the UNFCCC to date.  Finally, the parties estab-
lished the annual COPs.21   
The annual COPs began in 1995 in Berlin where the Kyoto Pro-
tocol was first conceived.22  In the quarter century since, the ‘com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities’ standard for the pursuit of 
Río’s collective goal became more impediment than pathway to the 
global abatement of GHG emissions.23  As our science gradually clar-
ified the nature of GHGs as an aggregating, cumulative pollutant,24 as 
well as the probable consequences of global emissions growth,25 the 
parties came to understand just how profound the needed changes to 
business-as-usual (BAU) were—as well as the complexity of the col-
lective action problem that collective change from BAU would be.26   
In a nutshell, a majority of the pollutant stocks already in the atmos-
phere were put there by one set of parties while the majority of pro-





 20.  UNFCCC article 12 obliged each signatory to create and maintain a “national in-
ventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of [the principal 
GHGs] . . . to the extent its capacities permit.”  UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 12(1)(a). It also 
obliged them to report to other parties “[a] detailed description of the policies and measures 
… adopted” as well as a “specific estimate of the effects that [such policies and measures] 
will have on anthropogenic emissions….”  Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b). 
 21.  UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
 22.  BARRETT, supra note 11, at 369. 
 23.  As Professor Stone observed, the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 endorsed “taking 
into account the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any 
costs which may emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards,” opening a rift 
in the diplomatic world between “developing” and “developed” nations that has come to de-
fine most multilateral environmental treaty since. Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differ-
entiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 276, 279 (2004).  And, as 
nations have disagreed over which is a “developed” and which a “developing” nation—with 
only the former being saddled economically costly obligations—the measures implemented 
protecting the environment have too often faltered. See id. at 279–81.  
 24.  DAVID ARCHER & STEFAN RAHMSTORF, THE CLIMATE CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTORY 
GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 17–32 (2010). 
 25.  The so-called “transient climate response to cumulative emissions” (TCRE) has 
been plotted as a global average surface temperature change per unit of total cumulative an-
thropogenic CO2 emissions. Joeri Rogelj et al., Differences Between Carbon Budget Esti-
mates Unraveled, 6 NATURE CLIM. CHANGE 245, 245 (2016).  That plot corresponds strongly 
to observed temperature changes to date and, assuming no nonlinearities, predict continued 
temperature change as well. Id. The problematic assumption is that the TCRE will continue 
uninterrupted, i.e., without encountering some nonlinearity. See infra notes 53–58 and ac-
companying text. 
 26.  See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.  
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the same forces that had gridlocked so many other major international 
institutions,27 the imbalanced COPs’ prospects grew increasingly 
dim.28   
The Kyoto Protocol was built from a premise of 
fault/responsibility.  It aimed to saddle roughly three dozen high-
consumption economies with onerous abatement duties while leaving 
the majority of projected future emissions (by then-low consumption 
countries) ungoverned.29  After the high-consumption economies 
mostly passed on signing, global emissions continued to increase at 
about their historic rate of 1.9 percent annually (doubling approxi-
mately every thirty-five years).30  Thus, in practical effect Kyoto 
changed only a tiny fraction of global emissions.31  With global tem-
perature change approximately linearly related to cumulative CO2 
emissions,32 it grew increasingly evident that responsibility and fault 
were no solution.33  
At Kyoto’s sunset in 2012, the UNFCCC convention/protocol 
model had come to epitomize the trade-off breadth of commitment 
makes in the depth of that commitment.  In Kyoto’s wake, the annual 
conferences of parties struggled to identify some other means of 
specifying the obligation(s) to abate GHG emissions.34  Customary 
international law has long prohibited the use of one’s territory to 
harm other states through pollution.35  But the causation dimensions 
 
 27.  See, e.g., THOMAS HALE ET AL., GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING 
WHEN WE NEED IT MOST 251–69 (2013); ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE 
CHANGE JUSTICE 10–40 (2010). 
 28.  HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 257–60; POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 190. 
 29.  DIETER HELM, THE CARBON CRUNCH 40–55 (2012). 
 30.  R.J. Andres et al., A Synthesis of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Fossil Fuel Com-
bustion, 9 BIOGEOSCIENCES 1845, 1854 (2012). 
 31.  WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS 
FOR A WARMING WORLD 247 (2013). 
 32.  H. Damon Matthews et al., The Proportionality of Global Warming to Cumulative 
Carbon Emissions, 459 NATURE 829, 830 (2009). 
 33.  The lack of “developed,” high-consumption economies ratifying the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) led to a prompt reevaluation and eventual amendment 
thereof, accommodating their concerns.  See Robin R. Churchill, The 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 24, 26–
27 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
 34.  See Wirth, supra note 15, at 521–23; HALE ET AL., supra note 28, at 260–63; HELM, 
supra note 29, at 50–72; NORDHAUS, supra note 31, at 316–26. The conventional economic 
wisdom has long been that discussions of climate fairness and justice must yield to the social 
“pricing” of carbon emissions. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade 
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); POSNER & 
WEISBACH, supra note 27.  For many reasons, the COP has never adopted this conventional 
wisdom and, as Parts III and IV argue, neither did Paris. 
 35.  See, e.g., Redgwell, supra note 13, at 695 (calling this the “no harm” principle of 
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alone have prevented that norm’s application to GHGs, while the dif-
fusion of responsibilities attending causation that is so ubiquitous yet 
indirect worsen matters still.36  Relative national wealth, technologi-
cal advantage, cumulative versus projected emissions, and many oth-
er criteria divided the subsequent COPs, blocking any agreement on 
specific abatement duties.37  What constituted a “developed” nation 
supposedly able to pivot a growth-oriented economy off of fossil 
fuels through concerted national action as opposed to one in dire need 
of any productive activity became a distinction rooted more in moti-
vation than in evidence or principle.38  To some, the experience con-
firmed how coalition-building (breadth) invariably lessened the depth 
of commitments.39  To others, it underscored the corrosive effects of 
self-interest and the incentives to free-ride on whatever efforts to pro-
tect a global commons others might make.40  Though COP-21 negoti-
ators studiously avoided talk of a carbon budget,41 Section B explains 






customary international law). 
 36.  BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 198–99. 
 37.  Wirth, supra note 15, at 524–27; ARCHITECTURES FOR AGREEMENT: ADDRESSING 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE POST-KYOTO WORLD 13 (Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. 
Stavins eds. 2007). It is far from clear that national wealth averaged over an entire populace 
reflects much concern for fairness. See Shoibal Chakravarty et al., Sharing Global CO2 
Emissions Reductions Among One Billion High Emitters, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 
11884 (2009). 
 38.  Where the UNFCCC had stated that “[t]he specific needs and special circumstances 
of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change . . . should be given full consideration,” UNFCCC, supra note 1, 
art. 3(2), the Kyoto Protocol divided most of the states-parties into two annexes—only one 
of which (comprising 38 nations) faced mandatory mitigation. See Kyoto Protocol, supra 
note 16, arts. 2, 3 & annex I. 
 39.  POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 63–72; cf. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global 
Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 736–83 
(1999) (arguing that “voluntary assent” voting rules have unique advantages in negotiating 
international GHG constraints).  See also GEOFFREY HEAL, NATURE AND THE MARKETPLACE 
76–86 (2000) (providing an argument that Kyoto’s heavy reliance on tradeable allowances in 
the land use sector created, in light of the profound uncertainties and variabilities thereof, 
cross-cutting influences on many of its signatories). 
 40.  See, e.g., SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS 74–102 (2007); William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding 
in International Climate Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339, 1341–43 (2015). 
 41.  Justin Gillis, Pledges to Cut Emissions Lag as Climate Talks Get Underway, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2015, at A1. 
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B. Mitigation: What Kind of Good? 
A public good is a good the provision of which is to all equally 
or not at all.42  There are few truly public goods in this sense.43  A 
collective good where individual consumption is independent of (col-
lective) provision merely entails some risk that the good’s providers 
will “defect” and seek to consume it without contributing to its sup-
ply.44  If climate mitigation as such is a good, it is a collective good.  
With no global sovereign, moreover, it is one that neither price nor 
quantity tools alone can supply.45  With GHG emissions so long iden-
tified with economic expansion (“growth”), emissions abatement ef-
forts have long been thought to create their own perverse incentive: 
the more effective the collective effort, the bigger the incentive to 
free-ride on it.46  And as different streams of quantitative work con-
verged on the conclusion that success in mitigation meant eradicating 
practically all fossil fuel consumption,47 mitigation began to seem 
like a good of unprecedented cost.48  
 
 42.  Thus, “[g]lobal public goods offer benefits that are both non-excludable and non-
rival.  Once provided, no country can be prevented from enjoying a global public good; nor 
can any country’s enjoyment of the good impinge on the consumption opportunities of other 
countries.” BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE?, supra note 40, at 1. 
 43.  See, e.g., William Barnett II & Walter Block, Coase and Van Zandt on Lighthouses, 
35 PUB. FIN. REV. 710 (2007). Indeed, of the truly public goods existing in theory, identify-
ing the actual demand therefore may be impossible, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theo-
ry of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954), at least if voters/consumers 
are not free to do so ‘with their feet.’ See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Ex-
penditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).  
 44.  A “public good,” thus, entails these risks by definition. But economists have had a 
hard time deciding whether GHG emission abatements—or the environmental effects they 
might bring—are or are not public goods in this sense. The importance of excludability has 
long been known, see, for example, James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 
ECONOMICA 1 (1965), as has that of rivalrous consumption. See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Eli-
nor Ostrom, Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: THEORY TO PRACTICE 3 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 
2005). But the “consumption” of a good like mitigation continues to defy simple categoriza-
tions. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. 
 45.  See Wiener, supra note 39, at 701–34; Scott Barrett, Credible Commitments, Focal 
Points, and Tipping, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND COMMON SENSE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TOM 
SCHELLING 29, 29–30 (Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph eds., 2012). 
 46.  See, e.g., Nordhaus, Climate Clubs, supra note 40, at 1339–40.  As more nations 
restrict emissions, market operations that cannot abate their emissions will, to some un-
known extent, seek out more favorable jurisdictions, thereby “exiting” (or “leaking”) from 
the jurisdictions restricting their emissions.  On this form of “regulatory competition,” see 
DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND 
PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2004). 
 47.  See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 48.  A public (or collective) good that is planetary is scale, while of ordinary theoretical 
difficulty for expected utility theorists, see, e.g., ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 29–30 (4th ed. 1932), has proven extraordinarily challenging as a matter of practi-
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       This picture of emissions as externalized cost and the abatement 
thereof as (global) collective good invites a still more troubling infer-
ence on emissions abatement and climate disruption.  Any state can 
act to reduce the costs to its public from climate disruption by invest-
ing in capacities to adapt, i.e., providing collective goods of adapta-
tion.  Nations differ in how well and/or quickly they may do so.  Na-
tions also differ in how, when, and to what degree they may be 
burdened by failing to adapt.49  Yet they also differ in their capacities 
to contribute to mitigation, either because they do not currently and 
will not in the coming decades contribute very much to cumulative 
emissions,50 or because reducing their own emissions would be ex-
traordinarily costly to their electorates and, thus, not likely to be un-
dertaken or sustained.  Finally, the reverse holds true as well: a nation 
can be exceptionally well-positioned to contribute to mitigation.51  If 
collective obligations imposed at an international level are viewed 
domestically as the opposite of self-government,52 though, miti-
gate/adapt choices present particularly stark contrasts in how public 
resources are allocated.  
A source of structural uncertainty in our estimations of Earth’s 
future climate must be mentioned: potential nonlinearities severing 
future conditions from what, to date at least, has been a predictable 
climate response to cumulative emissions.53  There is no baseline 
 
cal problem-solving. See GERNOT WAGNER & MARTIN L. WEITZMAN, CLIMATE SHOCK: THE 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A HOTTER PLANET (2015); BARRETT, supra note 13, at 369–91; 
Joseph E. Aldy et al., Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architec-
tures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373, 374–78 (2003). 
 49.  It is becoming increasingly clear that virtually all nations would face extreme costs 
of adaptation eventually. Camilo Mora et al., Broad Threat to Humanity from Cumulative 
Climate Hazards Intensified by Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 
1062 (2018). 
 50.  TCRE calculations treat every ton of emitted carbon, regardless of location or tim-
ing, as equal.  See generally Myles R. Allen et al., Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon 
Emissions Towards the Trillionth Tonne, 458 NATURE 1163 (2009). Thus, national decisions 
to emit/abate become a kind of “mirrored externality.” Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, 
Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 155 (2014). 
 51.  A small number of states that could contribute disproportionately to mitigation 
would be reason to prefer some distributions of emissions abatement over others. Wiener, 
supra note 39, at 771–77. 
 52.  See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 
33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 669–70, 717–23 (1986).  
 53.  ARCHER & RAHMSTORF, supra note 24, at 132. Thus, entirely apart from the distor-
tions inherent in viewing global climate disruption as an aggregate temperature average, id. 
at 133, progress on “equilibrium” climate sensitivity has been minimal and will remain min-
imal at least until some major nonlinearity actually occurs. Gerard H. Roe & Marcia B. 
Baker, Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318 SCI. 629 (2007) (arguing that the 
strength of any “feedback factor” in climate change predictions is likely to be unknowable 
and perhaps not that useful supposing it was known). 
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necessarily held in common among all nations party to the UNFCCC 
from which to differentiate duties to one’s people either to adapt or to 
mitigate.  This captures some of the turbulence in various nations’ 
stances on mitigation stringency.  When demography and time inter-
sect, social welfare calculations can grow unstable,54 generating con-
siderable turnover in elected governments’ views on adaptation and 
mitigation.  We might call this the trap of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ in the production of this particular collective good.55 
Of course, self-preservation is often the common denominator in 
international relations.56  Kyoto made that seem synonymous with in-
action on mitigation,57 especially as the many uncertainties about op-
timal mitigation were further isolated.58  Indeed, the trap was there 
for anyone aiming to analyze the social costs of adaptation, mitiga-
tion, or how the two should be balanced in some “average” or stand-
ard state or to derive international legal duties from orthodox theories 
of state responsibility, social welfare accounting, etc.59  COP-20 and 
 
 54.  Because the focal metric is cumulative emissions, delaying emissions by even a 
decade or more is not necessarily contributing materially to mitigation. And, unfortunately, 
projecting present reason balancing into the distant future – where unborn generations’ 
health and welfare are the source of value—has remained an intractable ethical problem de-
spite generations of patient study. TIM MULGAN, FUTURE PEOPLE 7–8 (2006). 
 55.  Cf. Stone, supra note 23, at 298 (noting that of the 186 nations that ratified the 
UNFCCC, only 25 saddled with mitigation duties by the Kyoto Protocol ratified it and that, 
of the 16 top emitters, only 6 representing 16.4% of total emissions did so); see also Aldy et 
al., supra note 48, at 374–80. 
 56.  Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 103–28 (1979) (argu-
ing that the ordering principle of international relations is anarchy and that self-preservation 
and expansion explain most states’ motives). Paradoxically, probabilistic modeling of “struc-
tural” uncertainties like equilibrium climate sensitivity can result in essentially unconstrained 
willingness to pay to avoid expected harms. See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and In-
terpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STATS. 1 
(2009). But in that case, of course, the analysis will undermine its own practical value to pre-
sent-day decision-makers. 
 57.  Barrett, supra note 45, at 37–39.  
 58.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE STABILIZATION TARGETS: EMISSIONS, 
CONCENTRATIONS, AND IMPACTS OVER DECADES TO MILLENNIA 105–58 (2011) (collecting 
projections of expected changes in extreme precipitation and temperatures, loss of perma-
frost and snowpack, ocean acidification, sea level rise and their variations by global region). 
As Freeman and colleagues argue, the IPCC’s lowering of its likely lower bound in the ex-
pected temperature gain range in 2013, paradoxically, was actually bad news for the 
UNFCCC parties because all it did was confirm an increase in the expected variance in fu-
ture warming estimates. Mark C. Freeman, Gernot Wagner & Richard Zeckhauser, Climate 
Sensitivity Uncertainty: When Is Good News Bad? (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 
Discussion Paper No. 15-76, 2015), http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/dp76_freeman-
wagner-zeckhauser-2.pdf.  
 59.  Responsibilities of this kind can, in other words, diverge in direction. See 
Chakravarty et al., supra note 37, at 11886 (arguing that pursuing mitigation “and meeting 
the basic energy needs of the global poor are nearly decoupled objectives”); POSNER & 
WEISBACH, supra note 27, at 179 (“The only way to ensure broad participation is to design 
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COP-21 finally found a path around this trap, although its ultimate 
arc will remain open to question for decades to come.  They created a 
treaty60 combining pledges,61 i.e., individually-determined contribu-
tions to mitigation,62 with legal duties: (1) to help develop adaptation 
technologies;63 (2) to track progress to those ends while disclosing 
that progress, or lack thereof, broadly;64 and (3) to contribute to the 
collective goal of “[h]olding the increase in the global average tem-
perature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature to increase to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the 
risks and impacts of climate change.”65  The UNFCCC’s nebulous 






an agreement so that all nations are better off”). State-state relations rarely conform to sim-
ple principles. Cf. David Singh Grewal, The Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on Inter-
national Order, 125 YALE L.J. 618, 622 (2016) (contrasting the “cosmopolitan legal theory” 
of Kant wherein state responsibility is measured by universal principles with the “Hobbesian 
realism” of rule by superior force). 
 60.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes it clear that the Paris Agree-
ment is a treaty governed by the public international law of treaties. See Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232. The United States signed 
Vienna but the Senate never ratified it. See Evan J. Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 442–48 (2004). None-
theless, Article 26 codified customary international law known since antiquity as pacta sunt 
servanda: the keeping of promises in good faith. See id. at 447, n.72 (“[E]very American 
court to address the Vienna Convention’s legal authority has concluded that its provisions 
express binding customary norms.”); Maglosia Fitzmaurice, The Practical Working of the 
Law of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 172, 181–82 (Malcolm Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
 61.  We might characterize all international agreements as either legally binding “con-
tracts” or non-binding accords similar in function to “pledges.” See Kal Raustiala, Form and 
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 586 (2005). Of course, any 
particular treaty or convention can combine both as the parties desire, but “[t]he choice be-
tween pledge and contract is a choice between employing and avoiding law.” Id. at 590. 
 62.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 3, 4(3). The agreement states that “all Par-
ties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts . . . with the view to achieving the 
purpose of th[e] Agreement as set out in Article 2,” which includes the temperature con-
straint. Id. art. 3. 
 63.  Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 9, 10. 
 64.  Id. art. 13. A mixture of “pledges” and “contracts” in Raustiala’s terminology has 
led some to characterize Paris as the joinder of “hard” and “soft” (as well as several “non-”) 
obligations. See, e.g., Lavanya Rajamani, The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between 
Hard, Soft, and Non-Obligations, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 337 (2016). 
 65.  Paris Agreement, supra note 5, arts 2(1)(a). “Parties” also declared the “aim to 
reach global peaking of [GHG] emissions as soon as possible,” id. art. 4(1), although nothing 
more specific to individual parties followed that expressed “aim.” 
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planted with a quantified and verifiable global target.66  However, the 
agreement also ordered all of the foregoing into regularized collective 
reviews—periodic global “stock-takes”—beginning in 2023.67   
Although this pledge/review model left the setting of national 
mitigation targets to each signatory’s choosing and avoided talk of 
state responsibility for missed targets,68 it ensured that the broad scru-
tiny thereof, along with the development of adaptation capacities and 
continued collective pursuit of the hard temperature limit, were hard 
commitments.69  “[T]he vast majority of Parties were keen that the 
2015 agreement, many years in the making, take the form of a legally 
binding instrument.”70  Thus, even though Article 4(4)’s economy-
wide emissions-cutting pledges are prefaced by a “should” (not a 
“shall”),71 much of the rest of the agreement is, by parity of reason-
ing, mandatory.72  As the 2016 election showed, even that much of a 
binding commitment to mitigate was too much to sustain politically 
in Washington.73  The tide of legal commentary74 and opposition 
 
 66.  See infra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. The 2°C goal has a long, disputed 
history in climate change talks.  See Mark New et al., Four Degrees and Beyond: The Poten-
tial for a Global Temperature Increase of Four Degrees and Its Implications, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y MATHEMATICAL PHYSICAL & ENG’G SCIS. 6, 7–8 (2011) (not-
ing that 2°C goal came together in the late 1990s as a reflection of two sets of beliefs: that 
harmful impacts were thought to start accumulating quickly moving from 2°C to 3°C and 
that limiting average warming to 2°C could be accomplished without dire or extraordinary 
costs).  Some have argued that it dates to the 1970s, well before the Río summit. See Samuel 
Randalls, History of the 2°C Climate Target, 1 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 598, 599–601 
(2010). 
 67.  Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 14.   
 68.  Susan Biniaz, Comma But Differentiated Responsibilities: Punctuation and 30 oth-
er Ways Negotiators Have Resolved Issues in the International Climate Change Regime, 6 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 37, 51–57 (2016). 
 69.  With the exception of the 2°C goal, each of these obligations is couched with a 
mandatory “shall.” See Rajamani, supra note 64, at 344–51 tbl. 1. Both internationally, see 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 60, art. 31, and domestically, an in-
strument’s legally binding character is to be gauged by the expressed intent of the parties. 
See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(3) (2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 
301 (1987). 
 70.  Rajamani, supra note 64, at 340. 
 71.  Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(4). The normative operators “should” and 
“shall” featured prominently in the Paris talks according to those familiar with the negotia-
tions. Biniaz, supra note 68, at 52. 
 72.  Rajamani, supra note 64, tbl. 1, at 344–51. 
 73.  One economist estimated that achieving the Paris pledge could cost the US between 
$3.3 and $6 trillion in new energy generating capacity, storage, and transmission investments 
between now and 2050. Geoffrey Heal, What Would it Take to Reduce US Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 80% by 2050? (Columbia Bus. Sch., NBER Working Paper No. 22525, 2016), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22525. That was remarkably similar to the price several 
economists once put on the Kyoto Protocol. John P. Weyant & Jennifer Hill, Introduction 
and Overview: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, 20 ENERGY J. 
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venom unleashed on the agreement—even though the text was une-
quivocal75—instantly polarized COP21 and America’s pledge in the 
public sphere. 
Of course, some of the United States’ most consequential trea-
ties have taken the form of a pledge.76  The global average tempera-
ture goals in the Paris agreement were almost certainly both aspira-
tional and carefully qualified in their precise meanings.77  Though 
some maintain that this shows Paris “rests more on economic, social, 
and political obligation than it does on legal authority,”78 Paris’ real 
wedge for changing present trajectories was always its successful at-
traction of so many credible commitments to mitigate collectively 
notwithstanding the clear, increasingly urgent incentives to adapt 
one’s national economy and populace.79  Credibility of commitments 
to mitigate can only be measured in soft variables like contracts, 
firms, inertia, culture, leadership, etc.80  However, the credibility of 
 
vii, at vii, xii (1999).  
 74.  See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25(2) 
REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 16, 16–22 (2016); David A. Wirth, Cracking the Amer-
ican Climate Negotiators’ Hidden Code: United States Law and the Paris Agreement, 6 
CLIMATE L. 152, 166–70 (2016); Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 
49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2016). A mitigation pledge that is non-binding need not be 
submitted to the U.S. Senate for its ratification pursuant to Article II, § 2. Wirth, supra note 
15, at 543–45. 
 75.  Paris calls on parties to “pursue domestic mitigation measures” with the “aim of 
achieving the objectives of such contributions,” Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4(2), and 
the COP-21 “decision” invites contributions “towards achieving the objective of the 
[UNFCCC] as set out in its Article 2. Article 2 states that the UNFCCC’s “ultimate objec-
tive” is the “stabilization of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” UNFCCC, supra 
note 1, art. 2. 
 76.  DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM (2001). “The Helsinki Accords, which included 
human rights provisions, altered the behavior of groups in civil society in eastern Europe, 
much to the dismay and surprise of their Communist overlords, who had signed because they 
believed that the provisions of the accord dealing with borders and economic exchange 
would strengthen their position.” STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
HYPOCRISY 32 (1999). 
 77.  Andrew P. Schurer et al., Importance of the Pre-Industrial Baseline for Likelihood 
of Exceeding Paris Goals, 7 NATURE CLIM. CH. 563, 563-64 (2017). 
 78.  Jennifer Jacquet & Dale Jamieson, Soft But Significant Power in the Paris Agree-
ment, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 643, 645 (2016). 
 79.  Cf. ALINA AVERCHENKOVA & SAMUELA BASSI, BEYOND THE TARGETS: 
ASSESSING THE POLITICAL CREDIBILITY OF PLEDGES FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2016) 
(finding that, among G-20 nations, INDCs were generally credible measured by the domestic 
institutions and factors bearing on the pledges being implemented). 
 80.  Cf. AVERCHENKOVA & BASSI, supra note 79, at 9–10 (tracking the “multiple di-
mensions” of a nation’s INDC “credibility” into four main elements: rules and procedures, 
players and organizations, norms and public opinion, and past performance). 
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the pledges to apply best efforts is nonetheless their most important 
property, as Section C explains, and one to which domestic mitiga-
tion efforts must pay close attention.  
C. Game of Assurances: Achieving Collective Mitigation 
In game-theoretic terms, policy-induced mitigation that does not 
simply push emissions to non-mitigating places or times presents a 
kind of assurances problem.81  Globalized supply chains, capital 
flows, and trading norms all, at least in theory, make “leakage” 
around or beyond a policy easier than ever.82  In reality, there is no 
telling what frictions any given firm in a specific time and place faces 
in shifting the site(s) of its operations,83 nor how readily free capital 
will flow across legal borders.84  There are precious few ways to 
model or otherwise compute average or standardized answers to these 
questions that would be useful to decision-makers.  Decarbonization 






 81.  The assurance problem goes beyond the ubiquitous single-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma 
to the regularity of “substantial voluntary contributions to public goods without outside en-
forcement” wherein the decision problem is the matter of degrees—turning on an ability to 
predict others’ behaviors “subject to varying limits of confidence.” Carlisle Ford Runge, In-
stitutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 
157, 162 (1984). That analysis begins from three assumptions. First, that “[w]herever bene-
fits and costs are a function of the total actions of the group, it [is] implausible that decisions 
to contribute are unaffected by expectations of the decisions of others.” Id. at 160. Second, 
when payoffs are a function of joint choice (as with most public goods problems), wherever 
expectations are not coordinated, each player’s choice of strategy is secondary to the correct 
prediction of every other player’s choices. Id. at 161. This is so because enhancing mutual 
predictability allows the players to optimize their own contributions. Id. Third, whether oth-
ers will or will not contribute is a probabilistic judgment, dependent upon the information 
held by each player. Id. at 166.  
 82.  See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness 
of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132 
(1995). 
 83.  See id. (finding that there is no conclusive evidence of “regulatory competition” 
pulling firms out of the US because of its stringent environmental controls). Cf. MURPHY, 
supra note 46, at 242–54 (finding from over a dozen detailed case studies that factor balanc-
ing by individual firms and interests is shaped by a multitude of influences, many of them 
impossible to quantify, and that site-shifting (or “reflagging”) is growing harder to predict as 
regulatory cooperation increases).  
 84.  Jaffe et al., supra note 82, at 137; see also Derek K. Kellenberger, An Empirical 
Investigation of the Pollution Haven Effect with Strategic Environment and Trade Policy, 78 
J. INT’L ECON. 242 (2009); Yuquing Xing & Charles D. Kolstad, Do Lax Environmental 
Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?, 21 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 1 (2002); Werner 
Antweiler et al., Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 877 (2001).  
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of trade exposure, long- and short-term dealing, fluid supply chains, 
and how all of it functions in fast-changing markets.85  Stringency 
confronts an endless maze of localized specifics, in short.   
This dilemma hardens as the number of relevant parties expands. 
The larger a coalition providing a good like climate mitigation, the 
less perceptibly effective the median contribution is, diminishing 
eventually to imperceptibility.86  This helps to explain Paris’ detailed 
reporting obligations, its unique “enhanced transparency frame-
work,”87 and its step-wise approach to stringency.88  If imperceptibil-
ity in contributing is easily mistaken for negligibility,89 Paris’ archi-
tects understood that threat.  A pledge need never be rescinded—
leaving states’ electorates otherwise prone to turn out their elected 
governments just as they were without the pledge.90  But Paris’ use of 
a temperature constraint to define the global collective good informed 
such individuated and soft obligations and, thus, the contributions.  
Finally, the agreement took full account of the temporal dimen-
sion in the pledge/review model.  If there has been one certainty in 
estimating China’s total GHG emissions it is that the estimates are 
soft and subject to revision—sometimes considerable revision.91  But 
China is not alone.92  Estimating quantities at such scales and scope 
has proven extraordinarily challenging everywhere.93  After years of 
data crunching, the United States is thought by many to have reduced 
 
 85.  Cf. Tim Jeppesen, John A. List & Henk Folmer, Environmental Regulations and 
New Plant Location Decisions: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, 42 J. REGIONAL SCI. 19 
(2002). Jeppesen and colleagues found that factors besides regulation account more directly 
for site-shifting decisions in many sectors. Id. 
 86.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 44 (1965). 
 87.  Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 13. 
 88.  Pivotal to Paris’s graduated approach to mitigation stringency are its periodic 
“stock-takings,” which are to “assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose” 
of the Agreement. Id. art. 14(1). 
 89.  RICHARD TUCK, FREE-RIDING 12–14 (2008). 
 90.  As Geoffrey Brennan has shown, the notion of contribution imperceptibility is 
vague, especially where selective incentives are available and motivational changes can re-
sult regardless of a contribution’s causal efficacy. Geoffrey Brennan, Olson and Impercepti-
ble Differences: The Tuck Critique, 164 PUB. CHOICE 235, 242–44 (2015).  
 91.  Jan Ivar Korsbakken et al., Uncertainties Around Reductions in China’s Coal Use 
and CO2 Emissions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 687, 687 (2016) (noting a 3% aggregate 
reduction by weight in national coal consumption, followed by a later estimation of an insig-
nificant increase in total coal-derived energy use for the same period, from the Chinese Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics and concluding that interpreting Chinese coal statistics has been 
complicated severely by retrospective revisions, altered methods, inconsistent reporting). 
 92.  Corinne Le Quéré et al., Global Carbon Budget 2015, 7 EARTH SYS. SCI. DATA 349, 
358–59 (2015). 
 93.  Id. Even putting aside the land use sectors, fossil fuel combustion and the GHG in-
tensities thereof have proven remarkably variable.  Id. at 358–59. 
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the “carbon intensity” of its energy production and consumption over 
the last decade.94  Without precise and accurate estimates of a long 
list of quantities, though, it is exceedingly difficult to track market re-
sponses to policy inducements, i.e., to know whether “leakage” 
around or beyond policy tools is occurring and where.95  Because 
slackening U.S. demand for internationally traded goods might just 
enable their consumption elsewhere, usable intelligence is still too of-
ten unavailable when it is needed.    
The full experience with the Kyoto Protocol proved more than 
wide participation’s importance to stringent mitigation and mitigation 
counting, though.96  It proved that knowing how to target consump-
tion in one quarter without that consumption leaking to other quarters 
or to a later quarter is a severe challenge in an increasingly globalized 
economy.97  Tracking land use changes over time, for example, it re-
vealed many more accounting obstacles than had been understood at 
first.98  During that same time, after some early models estimating the 
costs of GHG abatements were converging to a common conclusion 
showing delay as the key to minimizing abatement costs,99 it emerged 
that those models did not allow for induced technical change from 
 
 94.  See, e.g., John Larsen et al., Taking Stock: Progress Toward Meeting Climate 
Goals, RHODIUM GRP. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://rhg.com/reports/progress-toward-meeting-us-
climate-goals (“We estimate that US carbon dioxide emissions from energy consumption in 
2015 were 11% below 2005 levels.”). This is not to say that it has reduced its GHG emis-
sions by absolute quantity. 
 95.  See, e.g., Jaffe et al., supra note 82, at 157–58.  Even starting with the so-called 
“second generation” of empirical studies tracking loss of economic starts and/or capital from 
environmental controls, the results seem to be impossible to derive without extensive longi-
tudinal data sets. See Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empir-
ical Literature, 64 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1669, 1683–94 (2014). 
 96.  Cf. BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 255–60 (noting that, to properly evaluate Kyoto 
Protocol for its effectiveness, we should compare what actually happened under the protocol 
to what would have occurred without it but that Kyoto did “little to slow [the] trend” of an-
nual 1.9% growth rates in GHG emissions over the decades climate disruption has been a 
global problem). 
 97.  Steven Ferrey, When 1 + 1 No Longer Equals 2: The New Math of Legal “Addi-
tionality” Controlling World and U.S. Global Warming Regulation, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 591 (2009) (describing the common challenges fossil fuel markets in different juris-
dictions confront when regulators have attempted to quantify actual emissions averted by 
their rules); Michael P. Vandenberg & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: 
Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 221 (2010); H. Scott Matthews et al., The 
Importance of Carbon Footprint Estimation Boundaries, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5839 
(2008). 
 98.  Sandro Federici et al., New Estimated of CO2 Forest Emissions and Removals: 
1990-2015, 352 FOREST ECOLOGY & MNGMT. 89, 92 (2015) (finding from reanalysis that 
forest lands over the period in question were a net source of CO2 emissions globally, averag-
ing 1.52Gt CO2 per year). 
 99.  See, e.g., John P. Weyant, Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions, 7 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 27, 34–42 (1993); NORDHAUS, supra note 31, at 227–32. 
COLBURN  
198 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:6 
carbon-intensive to carbon-free energy sources.100  Because cumula-
tive global emissions are the focal metric,101 sham estimates for 
‘planning purposes’ are not just a waste of time: they diminish the 
confidence of partners whose own mitigation contributions will be 
vital to success.102   
The inversion of gross domestic product (GDP) growth from the 
high consumption to the low consumption economies that many have 
forecasted for this century103 punctuates this need to prevent mere 
site-shifting of carbon-intensive production/consumption as mitiga-
tion efforts ramp upwards.104  In this context, virtually any public ini-
tiative authority that can be used to induce technological innovation 
away from carbon-intensivity can be vital.105  Thus, Paris’ iterative 
pledge/review model treats GHGs’ accumulation in the atmosphere 
as a cumulative carbon constraint—several parameters of which had 
already been calculated in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report of 2015 (AR5) and which 
now fall into a widely known probability distribution.106  Most peer-
reviewed estimates in literature find that this cumulative constraint 
will require global emissions to peak soon and fall to negative CO2 
emissions by the second half of the century.107  Because the first gen-
eration NDCs were so clearly insufficient to that end, assuming the 
 
 100.  Michael Grubb et al., Induced Technical Change in Energy and Environment Mod-
eling: Analytical Approaches and Policy Implications, 27 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENV’T 271, 
293 (2002) (“Some models (e.g., Nordhaus) have just one aggregate energy-carbon sector 
with no opportunity for substitution toward non-carbon sources. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
these generate a modest response to induced technical change.”). With the possibility of in-
duced substitution of low- for high-carbon energy, the model results changed dramatically. 
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder & Stephen H. Schneider, Induced Technological Change and 
the Attractiveness of CO2 Abatement Policies, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 211 (1999). 
 101.  See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 102.  Cf. BARRETT, supra note 11, at 150 (noting the “problematic” nature of Kyoto’s 
self-reporting and verification scheme). 
 103.  Structural trends seem likely to deliver the GDP inversion throughout this century. 
See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 321-22 (2016). 
 104.  Aldy et al., supra note 48, at 375.  
 105.  David A. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies 
to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 844 (2008). 
 106.  The Fifth Assessment report concluded that to have a 66% chance of holding to no 
more than 2°C global average warming, no more than 2900 gigatons cumulative CO2 
equivalent could be emitted.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 10 (2015) https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/675 
31/metadc950248/m2/1/high_res_d/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf. That left 800-1000 
gigatons remaining as of 2015. Id.  
 107.  Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al., Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris 
Agreement Temperature Goal, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 827, 831 (2016); Hal Harvey et 
al., A Trillion Tons, 142(1) DÆDALUS 8, 9–11 (2013). 
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signatories can hold the deal together and agree on common carbon 
“budgeting” frameworks,108 Paris’ subsequent commitment periods 
have become the Rubicon, spotlighting the importance of mitigation 
stringency over time. 
If a joint and cumulative carbon constraint is to harden over 
time, Paris’ signatories must meet the major challenges of economic 
leakage and the maintenance of collective assurances on stringency. 
If contributors’ decisions turn even indirectly on their expectations of 
others’ mitigation,109 though, they must be able to tell the difference 
between contributing and free-riding.110  And that is no easy task.  
For example, the United States is assumed to have bent the curve on 
its GHG emission intensities through its push for installed wind and 
solar capacity over the last decade.111  However, the low GDP growth 
and tax credits subsidizing existing technologies that created that 
wedge are deeply contingent: the tax credits will phase out and cur-
rent renewables cannot compete without subsidy.112  Fossil fuel pro-
duction has proven singularly protean, market adaptive,113 and adroit 
at attracting political allies both big and small.114  What should a trad-
ing partner like China or the European Union expect of the United 
States over the next decade or two? There is no doubting US leaders’ 
 
 108.  Even assuming the IPCC AR5’s projections, there are importantly different ways to 
“budget” the GHG emissions that remain consistent with Paris’s temperature goals. Joeri 
Rogelj et al., Differences Between Carbon Budget Estimates Unravelled, 6 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 245, 246–478 (2016). The principal divides are between “threshold exceedance” 
versus “threshold avoidance” budget types, id. at 246–47, and between single gas (CO2) and 
multi-gas (all principal GHGs) models (which can be used in either budget type). Id. at 248–
50. 
 109.  Orthodox game theory situates these dynamics in a “cooperative,” as opposed to a 
conflictual framework, although the presence or absence of thresholds or “tipping points” 
can easily dominate such an analysis. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 87–98 (2d ed. 2006); see also Joseph E. Aldy, The Crucial Role of Policy 
Surveillance in International Climate Policy, 126 CLIMATIC CHANGE 279 (2014) (regarding 
pledges to mitigate and the coordinating role played by the Paris Agreement’s “enhanced 
transparency framework”). 
 110.  Runge, supra note 81, at 175–76. 
 111.  See, e.g., John Larsen et al., supra note 94, at 2–4. 
 112.  HELM, supra note 29, at 75–99; John Larsen et al., supra note 94, at 3–8. Conven-
tional wisdom has long been (and remains) that, barring a major technological breakthrough 
in storage technology, wind and solar will not be “grid competitive” wherever fossil fuel 
prices can be set by supply and demand. See, e.g., SCOTT L. MONTGOMERY, THE POWERS 
THAT BE: GLOBAL ENERGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND BEYOND 153–57 (2010).  
 113.  Thomas Covert et al., Will We Ever Stop Using Fossil Fuels?, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 
117, 126–34 (2016); John M. DeCicco, The Liquid Carbon Challenge: Evolving Views on 
Transportation Fuels and Climate, 4 WIRES ENERGY ENV’T 98, 98–99 (2015). 
 114.  See, e.g., Eliza Griswold, Undermined: A Local Activist Fights for the Future of 
Coal Country, NEW YORKER MAG., July 3, 2017, at 48. 
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political incentives to maximize consumption.115  Chinese and EU 
leaders surely share those same incentives.116  Given the US econo-
my’s immense capacity for mitigation, giving other nations a reason 
to trust in policy stringency is a critical part of reducing mitigation’s 
overall cost in Paris’ subsequent commitment periods.117  If initial in-
dications are any guide, mitigation in both the United States and Eu-
ropean Union are lagging far behind expectations.118 
Unlike certain collective goods, climate change mitigation’s 
“consumption” is not “rivalrous.”119  Indeed, it is unlike the “con-
sumption” of goods or services at all.120  Most of the beneficiaries of 
this collective forbearance have yet to be born and, indeed, might not 
be born if nations of the world were to constrain their own demo-
graphic growth.121  In all events, 2°C will affect Paris’ signatories 
 
 115.  TIM JACKSON, PROSPERITY WITHOUT GROWTH: ECONOMICS FOR A FINITE PLANET 3 
(1st ed. 2011) (arguing that in most mature economies like the US’s, rising per capita GDP is 
thought of as equivalent to increasing prosperity and, for that reason, GDP growth “has been 
the single most important policy goal across the world for most of the last century”). 
 116.  The EU pledged in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP-15) to cut its emissions by 30% be-
low 1990 levels by 2020 “provided that other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emissions reductions.” BARRETT, supra note 40, at 206. In its inaugural NDC for 
Paris the EU committed to cutting by 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. European Commis-
sion, 2030 climate and energy framework, EUROPA (last visited May 2, 2019) 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en. However, the EU pledges were predi-
cated in no small part on an expectation of slowing member economies—a trend its leaders 
would like desperately to reverse. See David G. Victor et al., Prove Paris Was More than 
Paper Promises, 548 NATURE 25, 25–27 (2017). 
 117.  Most economists have concluded that that remains severe under-investment in miti-
gation globally. Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph, Thinking Through the Climate Change 
Challenge, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND COMMON SENSE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TOM 
SCHELLING 3, 12 (Robert W. Hahn & Alistair Ulph eds., 2012) (listing as the first item in a 
“Schelling consensus on climate change policy” that governments have “significantly under-
invested in mitigation relative to the level of effort that would be economically efficient from 
a global perspective”). 
 118.  Jeffrey B. Greenblatt & Max Wei, Assessment of the Climate Commitments and 
Additional Mitigation Policies of the United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1090, 1092 
(2016) (finding from modeling 17 different policies additional reductions will be needed to 
reach US NDC’s 2025 goals); Victor et al., supra note 116, at 26. 
 119.  Cf. Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Fifty Years Later, 164 PUB. CHOICE 195, 200 
(2015) (observing that Mancur Olson’s propositions on the provision of collective goods as-
sumed that the good’s consumption was “rivalrous” in that shares decreased in proportion to 
the group size’s increase). 
 120.  If mitigation choices arise before localized consequences of future climate sensitivi-
ties can be backed out of the “general circulation models” (GCMs) on which the IPCC and 
UNFCCC COPs rely, they may be severely compromised by how costly, complex, and un-
certain the derivation of local consequences will remain. Michael C. Runge et al., Detecting 
Failure of Climate Predictions, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 861, 861–62 (2016). 
 121.  See, e.g., JOHN BROOME, CLIMATE MATTERS: ETHICS IN A WARMING WORLD 156 
(2012). 
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quite differently.122  Replacing the avoidance of “dangerous” climate 
change with the hard limit of 2°C total average warming at least has 
the potential to sharpen the obligatory tone of Paris’s commit-
ments.123  
Still, tradeoffs between public expenditures for adaptation and 
those for mitigation are seemingly inevitable124 given adaptation’s 
capacity to lower any jurisdiction’s costs of collective failures to mit-
igate.125  Indeed, the types and pace of adaptation investments are 
projected to vary tremendously depending on the degree to which 
mitigation succeeds or fails.126  Thus, adaptation is hardly “defection” 
in the game-theoretic sense, even as this interactivity of a signatory’s 
response options after Paris severely complicates the assessment of 
pledge credibility and, derivatively, the feasibility of mitigation’s 
joint supply.  With relatively high confidence that, even limiting 
warming to 2°C globally, catastrophic regional and local conse-
quences will continue to mount throughout this century,127 the inter-
activity of pledges, their credibility, and the successful pursuit of the 
2°C goal becomes extremely difficult for nations to anticipate.  In 
fact, especially given a “high ambition” coalition’s (unsuccessful) ef-
forts to push the 1.5°C temperature goal at Paris, there is every rea-
son to expect that the more nations already suffering global warm-
ing’s damages doubt the prospects for mitigation’s joint supply, the 
 
 122.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 7 (2014) [hereinafter AR5 WGII]. 
 123.  See, e.g., H. Damon Matthews et al., Cumulative Carbon as a Policy Framework 
for Achieving Climate Stabilization, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4365, 4367-
75 (2012) (mapping the emissions cuts needed to keep warming to 2°C globally). 
 124.  HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 267 (discussing poorer countries’ ostensible “right 
. . . to exploit the atmosphere as they develop” as a principal cause of “gridlock” on climate 
and the tradeoffs entailed for many of them deciding whether to develop with fossil fuels or 
to prioritize clean energy-based development); cf. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 217 (2006) (noting that low consumption economies 
would have to expand for decades before growing into a preference for environmental pro-
tections like those mitigation demands); see http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rm 
clima/pdfs/destaques/sternreview_report_complete.pdf. 
 125.  See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Social Cost of Carbon, REG. (Spring 2016), at 
36, 41. 
 126.  See, e.g., François Gemmene, Climate-Induced Population Displacements in a 
4°C+ World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 182, 187–93 (2011) (hypothesizing 
that population displacements would shift dramatically as between 2°C and 4°C of cumula-
tive global average warming); cf. AR5 WGII, supra note 122, at 21–25 (tracking several 
“key risks” across major geophysical regions in 2°C and 4°C scenarios). 
 127.  AR5 WGII, supra note 122, at 64–66; cf. Paris Agreement, supra note 5, art. 8(1) 
(recognizing the importance of “averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage asso-
ciated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow 
onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and dam-
age”). 
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stronger their incentives will be domestically to prefer investing in 
adaptation.  Part III situates Paris within our federalism and the legal 
doctrines governing this unique agreement. 
III. OUR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: SUPREMACY AND 
DORMANCY IN A CHANGED WORLD 
The Supremacy Clause’s inclusion of “all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States” within 
the ranks of the “supreme Law of the Land” that “the judges in every 
state shall be bound” by, “anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding”128 left to both state and federal 
courts the delicate task of interpreting the nation’s international 
agreements into domestic (federal) law.129  Doctrines of self- versus 
non-self-executing treaties emerged130 but have remained notoriously 
opaque, despite the fact that treaty practice and U.S. treaties in force 
have both expanded tremendously since the end of World War II.131 
However, the UNFCCC’s status within U.S. law132 must not be con-
fused with the Paris agreement’s status.  The latter is an “executive 
agreement” nowhere mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, the Treaty 
Clause,133 or Article III.134  As already noted, the Paris agreement 
 
 128.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 129.  See MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: 
THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 185–245 (2016) (discussing Missouri v. Holland, 252 
U.S. 416 (1920), and Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014), and finding the two cas-
es incompatible in their theories of the treaty power and, at the extremes, irreconcilable). 
 130.  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). 
 131.  Cf. John C. Yoo, Globalization and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) (making historical argu-
ment that treaties ordinarily require implementing legislation to fit directly into American 
law), with David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of 
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (arguing that 
text, structure and history all support a presumption of self-execution of treaties made). 
 132.  The UNFCCC’s “framework” nature is something of a term of art in international 
law, see Wirth, supra note 15, at 519, but is otherwise unrelated to its force or status within 
US law. Cf. Criddle, supra note 60, at 449–64 (identifying and contrasting “nationalist” and 
“internationalist” theories of treaties’ force in domestic courts and concluding that nothing 
about a treaty’s international significance must necessarily factor into a court’s application of 
treaties domestically). In its only case ever to have addressed an executive agreement made 
pursuant to an Article II treaty, the Court held that its legal force turned at least in part on 
whether the Senate that had approved the treaty had “authorized” the making of subsequent 
executive agreements. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528 (1957). 
 133.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur”). 
 134.  But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981) (affording preemptive 
effect to executive agreement); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415–16 (2003) 
(stating same in dicta). 
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was actively and overtly structured to avoid putting President Obama 
in the position of having to seek the Senate or Congress’s support.135 
Yet the diplomatic relations created and put in motion by the Paris 
agreement are another matter—potentially as consequential within 
several important U.S. legal doctrines as a treaty’s text.136  That 
leaves to our courts the especially delicate task of sorting a current 
presidential administration’s powers over diplomatic relations from 
the force and scope of the Supremacy Clause—something scholars 
have lately argued about vehemently and at length.137  
A. Supremacy in a Changed World 
By the time of the founding, several states had, by neglecting (or 
refusing) to honor commitments made by the Union, entangled it in 
disputes with foreign powers.138  Our federal courts were structured 
in no small degree to be able to check those abuses.139  Most im-
portantly, treaties made by the United States are both supreme law of 
the land and their own head of federal jurisdiction in Article III.140 
This constitutional inter-positioning of the federal courts between 
states and foreign powers has since taken on a very different signifi-
cance in a world of constantly expanding international ties—
commercial, social, legal, and other.141  Indeed, as the ‘We Are Still 
In’ coalition shows, it is often subparts of the United States seeking 
to redeem the republic’s good name abroad today and that is unlikely 
 
 135.  A great deal of ink has been shed suggesting that such moves by US Presidents are 
inherently unconstitutional. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Com-
pletion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2287-97 (2006) (collecting sources). Given the 
UNFCCC and the President’s Article II powers (and even ignoring theories of inherent ex-
ecutive power), I leave this line of argument about Paris to the side. But see id. (arguing that 
Article II leaves to the president, by necessary inference, the power to “complete” treaties 
and statutes expressing the will of the people). 
 136.  See infra notes 223–55 and accompanying text. 
 137.  See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
731, 734–40 (2010). 
 138. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 175 (2d 
ed. 1997); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
 139.  ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 3–18 (2017); GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 189–
93; HENKIN, supra note 138, at 298–303.  
 140.  Among the first reported opinions from our Supreme Court was a case enforcing the 
Treaty of Paris notwithstanding a Virginia statute to the contrary. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 
199 (1796). Recall Article III, Section 2 included cases “arising under . . .Treaties made, or 
which shall be made under the Authority of the United States,” as well as “all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors,” in its jurisdictional subject matters. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 141.  See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 27–29; Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette 
A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA. L. REV. 1621, 1637-1650 (2008); Julian Ku, Gu-
bernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2398-409 (2006). 
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to change in the near term.  Although some have argued this is legally 
irrelevant and that courts should interpret silences in the law to pro-
hibit such subnational foreign relations (a kind of “dormant treaty 
power”),142 the Supremacy Clause notably excludes a lot by only in-
cluding its three discrete forms of “supreme Law of the Land.”  There 
is every reason to believe that the separation of powers checks on the 
making of those laws was expected (and intended) to be a safeguard 
to the states.143  
What can we in the present make of the fact that the common 
law, administrative regulations, interstate compacts, and customary 
international law are all practically invisible for purposes of federal 
supremacy under the Constitution?144  Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins,145 of course, rejected the inference that the jurisdiction to adju-
dicate established by Article III entailed the authority to fashion rules 
of decision.146  Although Erie arguably trimmed the subject matters 
where federal common law-making is appropriate to a discrete list of 
fields stemming directly from the Constitution’s structure,147 that is 
hardly an afterthought.148  If this federal common law is the true 
origin of doctrines like “act of state,”149 “equal footing,”150 the down-
stream right to a flowing river,151 and/or others,152 that still creates a 
 
 142.  See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the 
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1162-64 (2000). 
 143.  See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federal-
ism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). 
 144.  Cf. Monaghan, supra note 137, at 768–69 (characterizing this omission as reflecting 
the “Lost World of the Founders”). But see Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1109–14 (2014) (arguing that the values protected by national 
supremacy are important enough to motivate a broadly preemptive “dormant foreign affairs” 
doctrine). 
 145.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 146.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80 (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)); see also 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496–98 (1941) (holding that federal 
courts sitting in diversity must apply the conflicts rules of the state in which they sit, citing 
Erie). 
 147.  Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common 
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885–87 (1986). But see id. at 950–82 (arguing that federal 
common law can apply wherever federal interests demand a uniform federal standard).  
 148.  Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemp-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New 
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 383 (1964). 
 149.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).  
 150.  See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 151.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
 152.  See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (upholding the 
creation of a federal rule of decision in cases of the commercial dealings of the United 
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great deal of federal “law” that somehow preempts inconsistent state 
law without mention in the Supremacy Clause.153  Still more central 
to the modern economy are the regulations of federal administrative 
agencies which occupy a unique rank in the Supreme Court’s es-
teem—below that of a federal statute but high enough to preempt in-
consistent state law, serve as the basis of a prison sentence,154 and 
provide other rules of decision in court.155  Interstate compacts ap-
proved by Congress have been (unequivocally) shoe-horned into fed-
eral supremacy despite their absence from Article IV.156  Court rules 
are a final example: we no longer think that the Federal Rules can 
have no independent legal force for their omission from the Suprem-
acy Clause.157 
But, then there is the anomalous and beguiling case of interna-
tional law and its place in our federalism.158  Under Erie, if interna-
tional law is not incorporated into federal law—and plenty of schol-
ars have mounted substantial arguments that much of it is not159—it 
may still find a place in state law.160  The modern Supreme Court has 
long maintained that certain elements of international law must be 
preemptive for the good of the Nation,161 although it has struggled to 
 
States).   
 153.  Monaghan, supra note 137, at 756–61, 765–68. Statutory interpretive methodology 
is another field where some have argued federal common law must necessarily exist. See 
Abbe Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie For the Age of 
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013). 
 154.  United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1911). 
 155.  Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 172 (2007); Chrysler Corp. 
v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013).  
 156.  See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & 
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); see also Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the 
Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010). 
 157.  Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940). 
 158.  A shrewd and succinct overview of the debate is Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary In-
ternational Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002). 
 159.  See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of 
Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20-28, 80–90 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the De-
bate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of 
the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal 
Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995); Trimble, supra note 52, at 
716–21. 
 160.  Meltzer, supra note 158, at 536–51; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159, 
at 870; cf. MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 342–61 
(2007) (allowing that international law may supply the rule of decision in state and federal 
courts if not displaced by valid state or federal law). 
 161.  Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Interna-
tional Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295; Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, 
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provide general contours to that end.162  Given the Constitution’s 
clauses explicitly disabling the states in foreign relations,163 it is al-
most surely correct that “the Constitution was designed to interact in 
distinct and specific ways with each branch of the law of nations in 
existence at the founding.”164  And much of living with the Constitu-
tion and international law’s place in our federalism was originally 
handled with great care by the Supreme Court.165  
Yet the exact positioning of executive authority in relation to a 
governing treaty remains wide open to debate.166  In the immortal 
words of Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence, these questions 
lay in a “zone of twilight” where the executive may exercise “inde-
pendent presidential responsibility” but emphatically not to the effect 
of ignoring federal law.167  Thus, while some “executive agreements” 
not ratified by the Senate may displace contrary state law, the scope 
of this power has been tied tightly to the President’s power to enforce 
law.168  There is no general presumption, after all, that treaties oper-
ate in American courts of their own force.169  The Obama Admin-
 
and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1625-41 (1997). 
 162.  Goldsmith, supra note 161, at 1664–98. 
 163.  Cf. Hollis, supra note 156, at 769–96 (examining the text and history of the Com-
pacts Clause and arguing that compacts or other agreements with foreign states should draw 
special constitutional scrutiny given the several dimensions of the Founders’ approach to 
states as sovereign). 
 164.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 144. 
 165.  MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GREAT 
EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914, at 62 (2004) (noting that the Marshall Court’s references to inter-
national law’s being a part of U.S. law “involved ticklish questions about respecting foreign 
sovereigns”). 
 166.  See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 234–44; HENKIN, supra note 138, at 
194–228; BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 229–31; Wirth, supra note 15, at 518–21; 
Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 74, at 887–88. 
 167.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 & n.2 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 
U.S. 221, 240–41 (1986); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680–83 (1981). Article 
II makes it the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3. All agree that Paris’s status as an executive agreement depends on its 
consistency with federal law. See Bodansky & Spiro, supra note 74, at 887–88, 929; Bradley 
& Goldsmith, Presidential Control, supra note 4, at 1257 (“A foundational tenet of Ameri-
can separation of powers is that all presidential action must be authorized by the Constitution 
or an act of Congress.”). 
 168.  See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1573 (2007); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign 
Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309 (2006). 
 169.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“This Court has long recog-
nized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and 
those that—while they constitute international law commitments—do not by themselves 
function as binding federal law.”). 
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istration’s legal justification for the Paris Agreement cited, among a 
litany of other potential sources of authority, the UNFCCC.170  Surely 
were an Article II treaty to guarantee some primary conduct right, 
privilege, immunity, or other entitlement to a foreign government or 
foreign national which was thereafter denied in a U.S. court—
misfeasance under the treaty, violating international law171—the inci-
dent would at the very least embarrass our presidency and the federal 
arrangements atop which it sits.172  Of course, extremal cases of the 
kind are extreme (and rare).173  Much more common are treaty rights 
and duties imperfectly specified and indeterminately implemented.174  
But, if anything, the modern Court has shown itself immensely defer-
ential to state law and interests, ever-ready to curb the preemptive 
scope of treaties to shelter those interests.175  Thus, whatever merit 
there may be in arguments that subnational efforts to mitigate should 
be preempted by a president’s claims that their high emitting econo-
 
 170.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, Presidential Control, supra note 4, at 1250 & n.222 (de-
scribing a copy of the “confidential submission to Congress” concerning the agreement, 
done pursuant to the Case Act, offering a “‘kitchen sink’ statement of legal authorities” for 
Paris). 
 171.  Fitzmaurice, supra note 60, at 175, 181–82 (observing that the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties both codified principles of pacta sunt servanda and obliged signato-
ries by its own force); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
603–05, 616 (4th ed. 1990). 
 172.  Compare BROWNLIE, supra note 171, at 35 (“A state cannot plead provisions of its 
own law or deficiencies in that law in answer to a claim against it for an alleged breach of its 
obligations under international law.”), with The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) 
(observing that “[i]nternational law is part of our law” and that, barring any “controlling ex-
ecutive or legislative act or judicial decision” to the contrary, it should decide “questions of 
right” in U.S. courts wherever applicable). 
 173.  The Court has on occasion held that treaties should be construed with reference to 
their meaning under the law of nations. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 
(1931) (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890)). But even the liberal interna-
tionalists have long conceded the prerogative lies with the signatory. Cf. Louis Henkin, In-
ternational Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1568 (1984) (“In prin-
ciple, every state has the power—I do not say the right—to violate international law and 
obligation and to suffer the consequences.”). 
 174.  See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347–60 (2006) (denying an ex-
clusionary remedy for violation of defendant’s right to counsel from Mexican Consulate un-
der the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations on grounds that convention did not specify 
an exclusionary remedy and that Supreme Court generally lacks the power to force equitable 
remedies on state courts); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 860–66 (2014) (holding that 
chemical weapons convention banning the use of all “toxic chemicals” would not support 
criminal liability for attempted poisoning with toxic chemicals as the convention was “non-
self-executing”). 
 175.  See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (rejecting multiple treaty 
grounds for recognizing judgment of International Court of Justice to free Texas inmate on 
grounds none of the specific provisions nor any implementing legislation rendered such 
judgments binding on state courts); Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360. 
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mies could become an important “bargaining chip,”176 they run head-
long at least into the Court’s demonstrated solicitude for those same 
states. 
The most deeply contested terrain in treaties and the treaty pow-
er has long been the extent to which the ‘government of limited and 
enumerated powers’ on the domestic front177 can use pretenses of 
“external objects” like “war, peace, negociation [sic], and foreign 
commerce”178 to create initiative power where the Constitution denies 
it.179  That in itself complicates expansive interpretations of the presi-
dent’s unilateral preemptive authority in dealings with foreign pow-
ers—like that stated in dicta in American Insurance Ass’n v. Gara-
mendi.180  From all that I have been able find in my research, 
however, what has never come to the Court is the Article II treaty, 
with its independent force in both domestic and international law, and 
that treaty’s place in domestic litigation (in light of Articles III and 
IV) arrayed against executive actions undoing the implementation 
work of a preceding administration, themselves arrayed against sub-
national implementation of the same treaty.  It is hardly surprising 
that such a unique tangle of questions would never have arisen in the 
Supreme Court.  Paris’s inimitable emergence and relationship to the 
UNFCCC, to say nothing of the breadth of its signatories and global 
support, however, may soon be coming to a court near you.  Section 
B describes the “dormant” preemptive doctrines that could also factor 
into such cases. 
 
 
 176.  Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1881–94 (2006). 
 177.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few 
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefi-
nite.”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 138, at 11. 
 178.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 177, at 313. 
 179.  See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 185–244; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ 
End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 
YALE L.J. 1236, 1339–40 (2008); HENKIN, supra note 138, at 185–98. 
 180.  539 U.S. 396, 416–17 (2003); see Brannon P. Denning & Michael Ramsey, Ameri-
can Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 825 (2004). Oddly, after citing three cases involving recognition and 
claims espousal, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203 (1942), and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1942), the Court in Garamendi 
pronounced that “[g]enerally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, 
just as treaties are,” 539 U.S. at 416, immediately before concluding that the executive 
agreement at issue in the case did not do so. Id. at 417. 
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        B. Dormancy in a Changed World 
“Dormant” constitutional limitations on states date at least to 
1824181 and by the middle of the nineteenth century had grown famil-
iar to the Supreme Court.182  Yet, motivated mostly by political theo-
ries of union rather than any economic theory of trade,183 this implied 
preemption of state laws “designed to benefit in-state economic inter-
ests by burdening out of state competitors”184 has long occupied un-
stable ground amidst the Court’s federalism landmarks.185  By the 
middle of the twentieth century, dormant limitations on states’ “intru-
sion” into foreign relations through the regulation of foreign com-
mercial activity had also been rooted in that ground.186  All told, the 
Court has confronted claims against states’ taxation of foreign com-
merce as such an intrusion,187 as well as claims against various other 
posturing toward foreign powers, entities, and capital.188 
For the era in which the dormancy doctrines hardened, “foreign” 
commerce and relations were the exceptions – rather like declarations 
of war and peace.189  The Court could mount a colorable claim that 
preemption grounded in structural inference and theories of union 
was needed to keep states from “prevent[ing] this Nation from 
‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce.”190  To-
day, foreign trade and the posturing that manages it is as expected of 
governors and metropolitan mayors as foreign business’ search for 
 
 181.  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 209 (1824). 
 182.  Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. 299, 315–18 (1851) 
(summarizing the Court’s twin theories of foreign and interstate commerce, Congress’s con-
trol thereof, and states’ remaining prerogatives in foreign and interstate commercial deal-
ings). 
 183.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5, at 1057 (3d ed. 2000); 
see also Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 
429–35 (1982). 
 184.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). 
 185.  Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1094–96 (1986). 
 186.  Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 187.  See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976); Japan Line, LTD v. Coun-
ty of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. 159 (1983); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).  
 188.  See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), aff’d 
sub. nom., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Am. Ins. Ass’n 
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Court’s “dormant” preemption theory in Gara-
mendi was criticized for its breadth by a dissent that included Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, 
Scalia, and Thomas. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 438–41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 189.  See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Japan Line, LTD v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (quoting 
Michelin Tire Corp v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). 
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favors from host jurisdictions.191  Perhaps even more importantly, as 
the latest dormant commerce clause precedents have reflected,192 fed-
eral law (here, by treaty) is now so prevalent193 that the original in-
ferential warrant from powers granted but unexercised to judicial 
freelancing has all but vanished.194  Indeed, it would be the submer-
sion of judicial power into politics and economic competition that so 
many of the Court’s doctrines aim precisely to avoid.195 
Still, this dormant preemption has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion as subnational climate change initiatives have spread and 
strengthened.196  Much of modern field preemption doctrine stems 
 
 191.  See GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 129, at 35–45, 60–76; David H. Moore, Be-
yond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014); Kysar & Meyler, supra note 141; Ku, supra 
note 141; Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 821 (1989). 
 192.  The Court has noticeably tempered dormant commerce clause doctrine over the past 
generation. See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013); United Haulers’ 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 336–37 (2007); West 
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205 (1994); CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 
481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-– (1980); see also Rocky 
Mtn. Farmers’ Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087–97 (9th Cir. 2013); see generally Dan-
iel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 U. DENV.  L. REV. 255 (2017). 
In fact, for many areas it will be preemption by a field-occupying federal statute that consti-
tutes the more direct threat to states. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) 
(holding that Congress had “left no room for state regulation” of oil tanker design). 
 193.  See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 179, at 1248–71; HENKIN, supra note 138, at 175-
230; LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS 
CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE (1984). 
 194.  See Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 
106 GEO. L.J. 1825, 1831 (2018) (noting the Supreme Court has not used dormant foreign 
affairs preemption to strike down a state law since 1968); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign 
Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 211 [hereinafter Goldsmith, Preemption]. 
 195.  Cf. Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, at 210 (“The waning of the distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs means that just about any state law, when applied in a 
case involving a foreign element, is potentially subject to judicial preemption. The expand-
ing array of preemptable state laws means that dormant foreign affairs preemption represents 
a potentially massive transfer of federal foreign relations lawmaking power to the federal 
courts at the expense of the states.”). 
 196.  See, e.g., Jessie Cammack, California, Climate, and Dormant Foreign Affairs 
Preemption (Again), 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1642 (2018); Augusta Wilson, Linking Across Bor-
ders: Opportunities and Obstacles for a Joint Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative-Western 
Climate Initiative Market, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227, 246–65 (2018); David Sloss, Cali-
fornia’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 (2017);   
David W. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints on Climate Change Agreements: Legal Risks in 
the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Linkage, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10478 
(2016); Jeremy Lawrence, The Western Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration and 
Constitutional Structure in the United States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225 (2009); 
Jeremy Lawrence, Where Federalism and Globalization Intersect: The Western Climate Ini-
tiative as a Model for Cross-Border Collaboration Among States and Provinces, 38 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10796 (2008); Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Greenhouse 
Gas Regulations, supra note 176. 
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from what might be called a “foreign affairs” context.197  Yet skeptics 
would surely be correct to note the ubiquity of fossil fuels and their 
infrastructure, subsidy, and health risks—and the range of actions 
implicated by their disentrenchment and replacement with renewable 
energy and carbon-conscious supply chains.  If all of that is to be 
preempted by structural inferences from the Constitution it would 
implicate the federal courts in a vast enterprise, searching for ‘bar-
gaining chips’ to aid a (current) president’s opaque strategy to undo 
an executive agreement possessed of treaty-standing under the Vien-
na Convention and public international law.198  And this, above all, 
should give those courts pause in challenges to subnational mitigation 
efforts. For the most potent influence in the interpretation of treaties 
as the “supreme Law of the Land” at the Supreme Court has lately 
been the interpretation’s significance to the “judicial Power.”199  Part 
IV considers these points in three contexts where ‘We Are Still In’ 
efforts are likely to present an unprecedented new normal in US 
courts. 
IV. PARIS’S FUTURE IN AMERICAN COURTS: THREE CORE CONTEXTS 
IN THE NEW NORMAL 
This part considers three contexts where the Paris agreement’s 
unique position in international and domestic law may influence a 
court’s decision involving subnational mitigation efforts, whether as 
a function of dormancy or supremacy.  Key to any federal court’s in-
tervention on behalf of an aggrieved party will be the exact manner in 
which regulatory power is projected—and whether to characterize 
that projection as legitimate, as “extraterritorial” and illegitimate, or 
as something else.  Equally important will be difficult questions sur-
rounding international law’s place in domestic courts and, particular-
ly, courts of general jurisdiction – like many state courts.  Finally, the 
remedial discretion that every court exercises in granting or withhold-
 
 197.  Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, 187–89 (discussing Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52 (1941)).  
 198.  See supra notes 140, 170 and accompanying text. 
 199.  Cf. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526–28 (2008) (refusing to find in non-self-
executing treaty authority for the president to unilaterally change the law and displace state 
court judicial discretion); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720–38 (2004) (interpret-
ing Alien Tort Statute to confer jurisdiction to hear but not a distinct cause of action or juris-
diction to prescribe rules of decision for cases of alleged torts committed on foreign soil); 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668 n.15 (1992); Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 U.S. 428  (1989) (holding that Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas did not create exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act because jurisdiction 
over foreign state signatory to the convention would put U.S. federal courts to adjudicating 
foreign state liabilities for torts committed on the high seas). 
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ing equitable relief inevitably turns on that relief’s prejudice to the 
public at large, i.e., consistency with the public good.  In each of 
these three contexts, sensitive discriminations between Paris and 
what preceded it will be critical. 
A. Extraterritoriality and Decarbonization: The Scale and Scope 
of Mitigation Actions 
Globalized finances, supply chains,200 and regulatory interest 
therein201 mean that subnational ‘municipal’ authority is more likely 
to reach conduct and trade spanning international boundaries.202  Our 
own dormant commerce doctrines have labeled this the extraterritori-
al assertion of jurisdiction,203 but virtually any serious effort to push 
decarbonization by advantaging low carbon competitors (or disad-
vantaging so-called carbon “majors”) will at least appear extraterrito-
rial and prejudicial in effect.204  It is in the nature of inducing techno-
logical change in free markets that regulatory effects spill over into 
cognate jurisdictions, though.205  And although the Court has made 
clear that it is entirely appropriate to regulate across borders where 
conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some sub-
 
 200.  HALE ET AL., supra note 27, at 113–88. 
 201.  In historical context, it is only quite recently that regulatory attention has turned to 
the supply chains producing the goods and services consumed in a jurisdiction—as opposed 
to its confinement to the consumption and production therein. See Douglas A. Kysar, Prefer-
ences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer 
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527–79 (2004). 
 202.  Ku, supra note 141, at 2412–14. This comes at a time when it has never been more 
difficult to secure Senate and/or Congressional approval of executive branch initiatives 
abroad. See Galbraith, supra note 3, at 1723–30. 
 203.  See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 
624, 642–43 (1982) (“The Commerce Clause … precludes the application of a state statute 
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the com-
merce has effects within the State.”); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 
(1976); see also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 59–60, 62–66 (1st 
Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds; Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 400 (2003).  
    204.  See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp.2d 1160, 
1183 (E.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d sub nom., Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 
F. Supp.2d 1151, 1187–88 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 205.  Cf. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 509–13 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Gould, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (observing that California’s low car-
bon fuel standard, which took account of fuel’s transport in calculating the carbon intensity 
of its production, only utilized state boundaries and long-distance travel for non-
discriminatory reasons and that any indirect regulatory effects in other states were incidental 
to California’s legitimate purposes); Clyde Spillenger, Risk Regulation, Extraterritoriality, 
and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law, 1850-1940, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 1240 (2015) (tracing the gradual pull of interstate markets on state legislatures and 
the gradual federalization of choice of law doctrines by means of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of Article VI). 
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stantial effect in the jurisdiction,206 claims that such efforts will “Bal-
kanize” our economy or “impinge on the sovereign interests” of other 
states will no doubt continue.207  Renewable portfolio standards, now 
in force in some fashion in over three dozen states, will continue to 
present such challenges if nothing else.208 
The Supreme Court passed on judging California’s so-called 
low-carbon fuel standard in 2014.209  But the Ninth Circuit, in a con-
tentious proceeding, divided sharply over the state’s right to ad-
vantage lower carbon transport fuels as it did.210  Carbon intensity in 
any product increases with the distance it travels to market and/or the 
use of fossil fuels in its production.  California’s law, thus, disadvan-
taged fuels derived from coal combustion in far-off states.211  Of 
course, states should face relaxed dormant commerce scrutiny to 
whatever degree they are a mere “market participant,” i.e., purchaser 
or seller.212  And they will also likely find an easier path to the extent 
any discriminatory treatment is in favor of some public facilities 
needing subsidy.213  The real test of Paris, the UNFCCC, and the stra-
tegic value of subnational implementation efforts, is where local law 
creates some kind of reward/sanction effect advantaging mitiga-
tion.214  In that context, efforts to advantage lower carbon production 
 
 206.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796–99 (1993). 
 207.  See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 740 F.3d at 512 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 208.  Brannon P. Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1519 (2014). 
 209.  See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Amer. Fuel & 
Petrochem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Corey v. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Un-
ion, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014).  
 210.  See Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky 
Mtn. Farmers Union, 740 F.3d at 512 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
 211.  Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082–87. An Oregon scheme mirroring 
California’s survived dormant commerce clause attacks, as well. See Am. Fuel & Petrochem. 
Mfrs. v. O’Keefe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 212.  Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 592–93 
(1997); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430-33 (1980). Exactly what differenti-
ates trading from regulating, however, has remained a murky subfield in dormant commerce 
clause doctrine. See Francis, supra note 192, at 303–06.  
 213.  United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 
(2007) (upholding county flow control ordinances that incidentally burdened commerce 
while increasing net recycling). 
 214.  Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that where a chal-
lenger can show that the “burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits,” the law should be invalid under dormant commerce scrutiny); see 
also National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. 1999) (assuming 
for purposes of reviewing the validity of the injunction that a “market participant” exception 
exists under the Foreign Commerce Clause because it might permit a simple immunity to 
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in parts unknown by burdening access to a local market are inappro-
priately “discriminatory” or “extraterritorial” only if one ignores the 
character of its opposite: maintenance of the fossil fuel subsidies and 
consumption aids regardless of their harms to others.215  It is nothing 
like the protectionism that unionists have singled out for dormancy’s 
strictest scrutiny.216 
When it is remembered that a cumulative carbon constraint is 
aiming to supply a collective good,217 only a sham application of the 
Court’s dormant commerce or dormant foreign relations precedents 
would preempt subnational efforts to create a reliable and significant 
pull on new, decarbonizing technology.218  The risks of unchecked 
warming are real and increasingly manifest,219 and bottom-up efforts 
to force technological change can only ever be contributory.220  In-
deed, their place in the assurances game Paris re-engineered is wholly 
unlike the domestic actions that have provoked ‘foreign affairs’ 
preemption in the past.221  Unless and until the Congress and Presi-
dent change the law to bar Americans from contributing to these 
ends, federal courts have no business doing so on anything more sub-
stantial than political theories of union.222 
 
Massachusetts’ sanctioning firms doing business with Burma).  
 215.  See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. Cf. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 
F.3d at 1089–90 (observing that regulations are not unduly burdensome to commerce or fa-
cially discriminatory simply for affecting in-state and out-of-state interests unequally); 
O’Keefe, 903 F.3d at 913 (adopting Rocky Mtn. holding and noting that “[o]ur federal system 
recognizes ‘each State’s freedom to ‘serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments.’”) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973)). 
 216.  See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 144, at 1088 & n.12; Regan, supra note 185. 
 217.  See supra notes 48 and 81 and accompanying text. 
 218.  Adelman & Engel, supra note 105, at 841–61 (describing the twin market failures 
of GHG emissions and technological innovation in climate mitigation and the necessity of a 
collective solution to each); see also Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate 
Policy, SCI. MAG., Sept. 11, 2015, at 1170, 1170–71 (arguing that winning coalitions of 
green industries thrive on feedback from policies and then become strategic partners in con-
tinual strengthening efforts).  
 219.  Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1080–86 (describing the “life-cycle” analy-
sis used in California low-carbon fuel standard and its targeting GHGs in the atmosphere 
which pose “the same local risk to California citizens” as a means of promoting the devel-
opment of alternative fuels). 
 220.  See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 221.  Cf. Goldsmith, Preemption, supra note 194, at 209 (“It is no accident that the doc-
trines were applied by the Supreme Court in two cases in the height of the Cold War involv-
ing parties—Cuba and East Germany—who were our Cold War enemies.”). 
 222.  Cf. Barclay’s Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994) (rejecting 
dormant foreign affairs preemption claim against California’s worldwide tax on multination-
al firms and observing that federal courts are “not vested with power to decide how to bal-
ance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole 
to let the States tax as they please”). 
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B. International Law as State Law: Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities Declared 
Many state courts are unquestionably possessed of the authority 
to declare and apply norms of international applicability in the mat-
ters to which they apply.223  François Gény’s neoclassical definition 
of customary international law as repeat state action plus opinio juris 
sive necessitatis224 has for generations evinced criticisms of its circu-
larity, theoretical incoherence and, increasingly, obsolescence.225  Yet 
customs still arise, especially if they are recast as so many interna-
tional norms.226  State courts are surely bound to apply valid, govern-
ing federal law227 and, where customary international law has been 
incorporated into federal law, it is final.228  But, as already noted, 
Erie insists that this state/federal question not be assumed away simp-
ly because a case possesses elements of (inter-)national signifi-
cance.229  
Whether federalized or not, the norms that have arisen from 
thick, multilateral environmental regimes are real.230  Moreover, as 
discussed above, mitigation/adaptation balancing is inherently politi-
 
 223.  See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: 
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1823 (2005). 
 224.  Emily Kadens, Custom’s Past, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A 
CHANGING WORLD 11, 12-13 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (conventional definition of cus-
tomary international law includes a two-part test: consistent action/forbearance and state be-
liefs that the actions or forbearance were required by law). 
 225.  Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative In-
ternational Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87, 97–105 (1991); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Custom-
ary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 34, 40–45 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016); Joel 
P. Tractman, The Growing Obsolescence of Customary International Law, CUSTOM’S 
FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 172 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016). 
 226.  BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 94–106. 
 227.  Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2). 
 228.  BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139, at 193–268; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Is In-
ternational Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1839–41 (1998); HENKIN, su-
pra note 138, at 157–58. 
 229.  See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 
409–10 (1990) (holding that federal act of state doctrine does not bar courts from hearing 
cases that might impute illegal motivations to foreign state officials); Bergman v. De Sieyes, 
170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state 
law in determining whether an ambassador in transit is immune from suit). 
 230.  See BODANSKY, supra note 11, at 262–66; Irini Papanicolopulu, The Mediterranean 
Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 604, 616–22 (Donald R. Rothwell 
et al. eds., 2015); Malcolm D. Evans, The Law of the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 651, 683 
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); Ved P. Nanda, Environment, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 287, 299–300 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997); see generally 
WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND 
BEYOND (1994) (describing the evolution of fisheries law).  
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cal and increasingly local.231  For example, the areas of the world 
most likely to benefit from heat-sink-moderated temperatures by their 
proximity to an ocean are also most likely to suffer catastrophically 
from sea level rise.232  This puts state courts to a choice, ultimately, if 
confronted with subnational mitigation effort: what is the scope of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’?  There is no single, 
uniquely authoritative way to resolve this obligation under UNFCCC; 
Paris surely did not do so.233  But the continuation of the 
pledge/review iterations will create COP decisions about emissions 
accounting, technology sharing, and other aids to bottom-up collec-
tive action that signatories will then translate into domestic reality.234 
This will surely present questions about the status of such norms in 
municipal courts and domestic law.235  Given the susceptibility of 
small contributions to imperceptibility,236 indeed, a court’s simple 
mention of Paris or the UNFCCC could be instrumental to others’ 
confidence and contributions in the future.237  American courts could 
become an important adjudicator of customary international norms 
arising under Paris’s unique pledge/review system, not least because 
of their thicker connections to their electorates (neoliberal objections 
to customary international law’s tension with democratic consent is 
blunted considerably in the majority of state courts),238 their more 
 
 231.  See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 232.  ARCHER & RAHMSTORF, supra note 24, at 133. 
 233.  See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
 234.  The proposition that state courts rarely consider customary international law and 
that, when they do, they typically defer to the federal government’s view(s), see, for exam-
ple, Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International 
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 314, although perhaps still the conventional wisdom, ignores 
the authority of state courts within our federalism. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbati-
no, 376 U.S. 398, 421–27 (1964) (weighing the possibility that the “act of state” doctrine is 
state law).  
 235.  Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(observing under another convention/protocol regime that a holding that “the Parties’ post-
ratification side agreements were ‘law’ would raise serious constitutional questions in light 
of the nondelegation doctrine, numerous constitutional procedural requirements for making 
law, and the separation of powers.”). 
 236.  See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 237.  Even in fields dominated by bilateral treaties and domestic trade regulation it has 
proven essentially impossible to rule out the rise of customary international law as more and 
more adjudications converge to common standards. See Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International Law, 14 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 327, 329 (1993) (examining how bilateral investment treaties elucidate and 
portend the crystallization of customary international foreign investment law).  
 238.  See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the 
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1842–76 (2001) (analyzing the difference be-
tween state and Article III court’s justiciability doctrine). Curiously, many state judiciaries, 
at the same time they have grown closer to an electorate by constitutional changes in the se-
lection of judges, increasingly have looked abroad in interpreting domestic law. See ROBERT 
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controllable risks of error,239 and their physical and social proximity 
to the local trade-offs adaptation-mitigation optimizing entails.240  
Regardless of customary international law’s ultimate juristic footing 
in our federalism, declarations of this kind could prove vital to the fu-
ture specification of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
obligation under international law.241 
The partisan, often bitter politics of international human rights 
law which so long shaded these structural debates among American 
analysts242 have overshadowed the fields in which customary interna-
tional norms have been vital to American courts.243  To just this ex-
tent, state court adjudication of custom and customary international 
norms can supply the evidence of practice and opinio juris that tradi-
tional international lawyers so often seek.244  As Professor Stephan 
has observed, the “argument for federalizing the law of nations is su-
 
F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 283–301 (2009). 
 239.  Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008) (ex-
ploring the advantages of combining policy variation and reversibility). 
 240.  Not facing the Article III limitations faced by federal courts, see HENKIN, supra 
note 138, at 142, state courts are often freer to engage merits questions than are their federal 
counterparts. See Lisotkin, supra note 239, at 480; WILLIAMS, supra note 238, at 298–301. 
 241.  See BURKE, supra note 230, at 263–302 (tracing the use of domestic sanctions and 
other municipal law in the rise of an international moratorium on commercial whaling from 
among the parties to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling); Stone, su-
pra note 23, at 298–300 (noting that public expenditures on adaptation are more likely to be 
internalized benefits than those on mitigation and that relatively rich nations stand much to 
gain from having ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ progressively clarified); cf. 
Chodosh, supra note 225, at 110 (observing that the circularities of the opinio juris element 
and its “institutional weakness” have consigned customary international law to a dysfunc-
tional status in contemporary practice but that a stricter approach grounded in a forum’s 
powers and traditions of declaring its own rules of decision could enhance international cus-
tom in both domestic and international venues). 
 242.  Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159, at 836 (arguing that Henkin and 
others manipulated the third Restatement of foreign relations law’s assertion that customary 
international law is federal law through “pure bootstrapping” by citing an article Henkin 
himself authored and nothing else), with Koh, supra note 228, at 1828 (“Bradley and Gold-
smith mount virtually no arguments explaining why fifty state courts and legislatures should 
be free to reject, modify, reinterpret, selectively incorporate or completely oust customary 
international law rules from domestic law.”). 
 243.  See, e.g., William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. 
COMPARATIVE L. 383 (2000); Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary In-
ternational Law, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 783 (1984).  
 244.  Cf. Bradley, supra note 225, at 46 (“Instead of hypothesizing that custom is a re-
flection of some underlying spirit, will, or consciousness, the standard view today attempts 
to ground [customary international law] in the actual practices and beliefs of states.”); Cho-
dosh, supra note 225, at 119–20 (noting that, in light of customary international law’s many 
failings and challenges, declarations of custom by municipal courts can provide a middle 
path bridging the gaps left by positive, treaty-based law and more nebulous theoretical ac-
counts of opinio juris).  
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perficially compelling,”245 but the evidence is overwhelming that the 
Framers expected a “general law” of commerce and commercial 
practice (“lex mercatoria”) to take root in both state and federal 
courts without the strictest (positivistic) attention to that law’s 
sources.246  
To what degree, then, are state courts of general jurisdiction in 
any position to focus and to declare a customary international law of 
mitigation?  Recall that the UNFCCC’s ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities’ to prevent ‘dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system’247 were finally suc-
ceeded after 20+ COPs with Paris’ complex scheme of political and 
legal obligations.248  The conventional position casts “parochial state 
acts [as] threaten[ing] the foreign relations interests, and perhaps the 
national security, of the entire nation—a situation the Constitution is 
plainly designed to avoid.”249  Ironically, though, it has been neolib-
eral revisionists who have pushed back the hardest for state jurisdic-
tion and the authority to declare the law of anything not positively 
federal.250  And there is no good reason to assume away state prerog-
ative to interpret these norms in development.  Indeed, when empiri-
cal work on customary international law has been done, the evidence 
gathered suggests that adjudicators are more likely “engaged in a 
forward-looking or aspirational exercise” than they are mechanically 
running some traditional two-part test for a custom’s existence.251  
Every state’s judiciary is presumably as perfectly empowered to 
these ends as the judiciary of other states.  Of course, the states are 
not all the same.  Those with especially large markets can pull in in-
vestments and induce compliance with their law notwithstanding the 
higher costs imposed on carbon-intensive production.252  But states 
 
 245.  Paul B. Stephan, Inferences of Judicial Lawmaking Power and the Law of Nations, 
106 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1805 (2018).  
 246.  See Stephan, supra note 245, at 1796–97; DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING 
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC 
WORLD, 1664-1830, at 207–58 (2005); Koh, supra note 228, at 1830–31.  
 247.  See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 248.  See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 249.  Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1617, 1621 (1997) (“In foreign affairs, the nation must speak with one voice, not fif-
ty”).  
 250.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 159, at 870–76; Goldsmith, Preemption, su-
pra note 194; BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 139; Trimble, supra note 52, at 718–23. 
 251.  Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do 
It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117, 147 (Curtis A. 
Bradley ed., 2016).  
 252.  DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A 
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checking one another are surely as accountable or more so than the 
presidency left essentially unchecked,253 and state court testing of 
public reasons for subnational initiatives on adaptation/mitigation 
balancing, because it can be carried on in parallel, can provide an in-
valuable platform for the sorting of mitigation, and adaptation priori-
ties.254  State court litigation of local laws advantaging or mandating 
mitigation efforts should reflect this constitutional prerogative re-
served to our states (or to the people).255 
C. Mitigation Injuries: Remedial Discretion and Subnational  
……          Action 
The Roberts Court has gone to considerable lengths to clarify 
the standards for the awarding of injunctive relief in federal court.256  
As it observed in Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms,257 “[i]t is not 
enough for a court considering a request for injunctive relief to ask 
whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not issue; 
rather, a court must determine that an injunction should issue.”258  
The Court’s factored tests—one for preliminary and another for per-
manent relief259—are to inform the sound discretion of the trial 
court.260  And the Roberts Court has made it emphatically clear that 
 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 5–8 (1995) (calling this the “California effect”). 
 253.  Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1275 (“[T]he main forms of accountabil-
ity for presidential control over international law are congressional and public scrutiny of 
international agreements made by the executive branch, a task made harder by the fact that 
the executive branch has not entirely complied with its publication and reporting duties 
. . .”).  
 254.  Notwithstanding Professor Livermore’s recent assertion that “[c]limate change is 
not a context in which state experimentation is likely to produce valuable deliberative infor-
mation” about the “policy question[s]” in adaptation/mitigation balances, Michael A. Liver-
more, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 692 (2017), it should be quite clear 
that the practical keys to any electorate’s support for mitigation are twofold: (1) how to re-
duce the costs of decarbonization both in the immediate and medium-term futures; and (2) 
whether mitigation contributions can and are likely to be matched by enough other jurisdic-
tions to be worth the (jurisdiction’s) sacrifice(s). See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying 
text. If this isn’t “valuable deliberative information” of the sort Livermore maintains justifies 
decentralized experimentation, nothing is. 
 255.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 256.  See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 572 U.S. 663 (2014); Nken v. Holder, 556 
U.S. 418 (2009); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (2010); Winter v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); eBay, 
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Sereboff v. Mid. Atlantic Med. Servs., 
Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 257.  Monsanto Co., 561 U.S. 139 (2010). 
 258.  Id. at 158 (emphasis in original). 
 259.  Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 
1023–44 (2015). 
 260.  For a preliminary injunction, the factors are (1) likelihood of success on the merits, 
(2) likelihood the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, (3) the bal-
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there is no general presumption either favoring or disfavoring any 
award of equitable relief.261  An earlier era where presumptions on 
the presence or lack of “irreparable” injury made equity doctrines 
tick262 has given way to a factored but largely free-form weighing of 
hardships, functioning mostly as a four-pronged proof burden on the 
party seeking the relief.263 
In the context of injunctive relief against government, the Court 
has also said that “there is little practical difference between injunc-
tive and declaratory relief.”264  But this is not always so.  A declarato-
ry judgment is only fully remedial if in its institutional context the 
parties (or their successors in office) behave as an injunction would 
entitle the claimants to demand.265  As regulatory and statutory 
claimants have faced the ‘no presumption in favor’ hurdle, it has be-
come manifest that many policy-driven contours in government can 
continue uninterrupted in the absence of an injunction.266  For 
preemption and Commerce Clause challenges, particularly, injunctive 
(and especially preliminary injunctive) relief can be decisive—and it 
is not to be skipped around the Court’s factored tests.267  Even fol-
 
ance of equities between the parties, and (4) the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 
[Short Form – Rule 10.9] For a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must have demonstrated 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury, (2) that the remedies available at law are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury, (3) that the balance of equities is in favor of the remedy, 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the remedy. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  
 261.  See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive re-
lief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of 
discretion.”); Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs 
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an 
injunction…. Issuing a preliminary injunction only on a possibility of irreparable harm is 
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that 
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 262.  Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Acci-
dental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 219–31 
(2012). 
 263.  Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 262, at 210–11; see also Bray, supra note 259, 
at 1036–44. 
 264.  California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982); see also Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943). 
 265.  Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2459–87 (2014) Generations of “institutional reform” litigation put 
this point in stark relief. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY 
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1999). 
 266.  Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485 
(2010). 
 267.  Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 668–70 (2003) (rejecting 
the award of a preliminary injunction in dormant commerce clause challenge to state law 
regulating prescription drug prices because “petitioner had not carried its burden of showing 
a probability of success on the merits of its claims”). 
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lowing the Ninth Circuit’s remand to the district court for further 
proceedings, California’s continued implementation of its low carbon 
fuel standard (LCFS) almost a decade after the plaintiffs had first 
filed their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief was un-
remitting.268  A preliminary injunction during that time could have 
been lethal for the LCFS program and clearly implicated the “public 
interest.”269  
Of course, the supply of public (or collective) goods is full of 
uncertainties surrounding the beneficiaries, reasonable alternatives, 
optimizing supply, etc.270  The Supreme Court was obviously aware 
of this when, in applying its factored test in Winter v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council,271 it first quoted George Washington and 
worked to explain the benefits of military preparedness.272  And alt-
hough the Court has remained studiously aloof to the unique prob-
lems presented by the diffusion of environmental risks and, thus, their 
abatement,273 careful consideration of the contributory nature of de-
carbonization policies and technology forcing, especially in light of 
Paris’s cumulative carbon and assurances framework,274 would turn 
to whether the public interest factor can ever defeat an application for 
injunction—preliminary or permanent.  Of the “notably porous”275 
terms in the Court’s factors, the ‘public interest’ anchor in each test, 
shorn of presumptions, can easily present what courts are least able to 
measure within the confines of a lawsuit.276  The eBay Court may 
have sought to blunt this critique by phrasing its factor in the nega-
 
 268.  Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258 F. Supp.3d 1134, 1138–40 (E.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 269.  As Judge Denlow observed five years before Winter, the ‘public interest’ factor in 
the granting of preliminary injunctive relief allowed the court to consider the interests of 
non-parties—and to override a showing of irreparable harm by the plaintiff. Morton Denlow, 
The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. 
LITIG. 495, 511–12 (2003).  
 270.  See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
 271.  555 U.S. 7 (2008).  
 272.  Winter, 555 U.S. at 12. The Court made a similar case, if only implicitly, in Wein-
berger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318–19 (1982) (reversing grant of preliminary in-
junction against US Navy for probable violations of the Clean Water Act).  
 273.  Goldstein, supra note 266, at 528–39; Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, 
Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 537–38 (1984) (not-
ing that injunctions to enforce environmental statutes often must grapple with “qualified” 
legal rights and duties combining multiple goods). 
 274.  See supra notes 60-110 and accompanying text. 
 275.  Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 262, at 213.  
 276.  Cf. Bray, supra note 259, at 1028–29 (calling the public interest factor a “long-
standing concern of equity” but noting that making it something a claimant must prove 
lacked support in the equity traditions).  
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tive,277 but there is no escaping the challenge with phraseology.  Ei-
ther plaintiffs bear a burden and the court must choose on the public 
interest factor or not.  
Unlike the old protectionism cases, mitigation efforts today are 
rarely a projection of “unaccountable power”278 aiming to rig the 
terms by which firms compete.  In the vast majority of instances 
where subnational decarbonization efforts are afoot, a public has 
elected to burden itself to some considerable extent by contributing – 
be it in the form of taxes, higher prices, constrained product choices, 
conservation, etc.279  That has often been a significant factor in 
dormant commerce liability determinations.280  For purposes of 
weighing the public interest in the withholding of injunctive relief de-
spite some (probable) doctrinal violation (and even laying aside the 
concentrated economic and political power of fossil fuel interests and 
other carbon majors281), a local or state public’s autonomy and right 
to contribute should weigh no less in the court’s balance than should 
any injunction’s binding of non-parties282 or the polycentricity of 
climate mitigation decision-making.283  With GHG emissions’ accu-
mulation284 and future peoples’ practicable invisibility in electoral 
politics, any court (preliminarily) enjoining a subnational mitigation 
policy for private losses in profitability must surely demand clear and 
convincing evidence of mistake.285  To be sure, declaratory relief may 
 
 277.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
 278.  TRIBE, supra note 183, at 411. 
 279.  See, e.g., Lawrence, The Western Climate Initiative, supra note 196, at 1227–30. 
Moreover, as Washington’s initiative 1631 demonstrated, they just as easily elect not to do 
so. See Timothy Cama, Washington State Voters Reject Carbon Tax, THE HILL (Nov. 7, 
2018, 12:11 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/415418-washington-state-
voters-reject-carbon-tax. 
 280.  See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 345 (2007) (plurality opinion); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 146–52 (1986); 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956–57 (1982); Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–73 (1981). 
 281.  Cinnamon P. Carlarne, On Localism and the Persistent Power of the State, 112 AM. 
J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 285, 289 (2018). 
 282.  Cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 275 (4th ed. 2010) (observ-
ing that injunctions against government enforcement of regulations should ordinarily pertain 
only to the parties bringing suit); see Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (same). 
 283.  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–
405 (1978) (noting that motivations of self-interest make the adversarial presentation of ar-
gument in most bilateral adjudications more reliable than they would be for polycentric tasks 
and adjudications). 
 284.  See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 285.  Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (calling the preliminary injunction an “extraordinary reme-
dy”); see also Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he old sliding-scale approach to preliminary injunctions . . . 
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or may not achieve what a personal command backed by the con-
tempt power can—which is exactly why the Court’s ‘new equity’ has 
so forcefully underscored judicial choice.286  But in the context of 
subnational GHG emissions abatement and a federal court’s duty to 
consider the public interest before enjoining efforts to contribute to-
ward Paris’ ends, this must be a choice alert to the values of subna-
tional autonomy, the ever-present right simply to do business else-
where, and the unfortunate fact that we are all running out of time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The in again/out again nature of even subnational climate initia-
tives287 is indicative of the adaptation/mitigation trade-offs more and 
more governments are facing.  Even if a new president in 2021 re-
commits the U.S. government to the Paris agreement and America’s 
2016 pledge, a formidable opposition to any nationally imposed caps 
on carbon will almost surely re-emerge and complicate (if not defeat) 
any legislative alternatives.  With cheap, pervasive fossil fuel energy 
as tightly tied to economic prosperity as it was in the twentieth centu-
ry, decarbonizing transport, electrical grids, and other energy-
intensive industrial sectors without the complete or at least near-
complete cooperation of all economically significant jurisdictions 
puts mitigation into a difficult situation politically, as well.  In short, 
Trump’s vacuum, if only in legacy form, will probably persist for the 
foreseeable future.  Subnational actions will therefore need legal pro-
tection even as they struggle forward politically.  American courts 
would do well to study very carefully the features of our foreign af-
fairs federalism and, in assessing subnational climate mitigation ef-




is no longer controlling or even viable. It appears that a party moving for a preliminary in-
junction must meet four independent requirements.”). 
 286.  Cf. Bray, supra note 259, at 1036 (“The Court’s exposition of equitable principles 
has been dominated by two themes. One is the exceptionalism of equitable remedies, and the 
other is the pervasive discretion that courts have when granting them.”). 
 287.  Wilson, supra note 196, at 237–39, 265–66; see generally Jonas Monast, From 
Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New Challenges in Carbon Market Design, 8 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175 (2017). 
